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Pre-contractual assessments in mortgage loans: Promoting 
responsible lending or exacerbating financial exclusion? 
– 
A comparative study of the South African National Credit Act and 
the European Mortgage Credit Directive 
 
 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
1.1 General Introduction 
The instrument of credit has been described as a ‘double edged sword’: ‘Whilst credit 
allows access to products or services that cannot be acquired out of a single month’s 
income, it can also be a dangerous instrument that can lead to high levels of debt and 
indebtedness.’1 It is a general governmental aim to level the playing field in the area 
of conflict between the accessibility to credit on the one hand and the prevention of 
over-indebtedness on the other. In this context, the terms ‘responsible lending’ and 
‘responsible credit regime’ have become core ideas for international regulatory 
reforms in the consumer credit market. They have particularly gained new ground in 
the wake of the global financial crisis that shook the world economy ever since 2007.2 
It is now widely accepted that regulation of the financial sector must be ‘responsible’ 
in the sense that it includes protection against over-indebtedness of consumers.3 
Furthermore, the financial crisis changed the view on the impact of over-indebtedness 
in the sense that over-indebtedness is no longer seen only as an individual problem, 
but rather considered as a serious threat for the stability of the financial market. In 
particular, a responsible lending regime and the protection of consumers is crucial in 
the mortgage credit market, where over-indebtedness can have severe consequences 
for consumers, namely eviction and the loss of their home; and for the stability of the 
financial system as a whole.4 
																																																						
1 Department of Trade and Industry ‘Making Credit Markets Work: A Policy Framework for Consumer 
Credit’ (2004) 6, available at https://www.ncr.org.za (hereafter ‘Policy Framework (2004)). 
2 V Mak ‘What is Responsible Lending? The EU Consumer Mortgage Credit Directive in the UK and 
the Netherlands’ (2015) 38 Journal of Consumer Policy 411. 
3 The World Bank ‘Responsible lending: overview of regulatory tools’ (2013), available at 
http://documents.worldbank.org. 





1.2 Scope of the study and limitations 
The legislation and case law in South Africa and the European Union (hereafter ‘EU’), 
that will be explored in detail in this study, deals with the objectives to create a 
responsible lending regime in the credit market as a whole and in the mortgage credit 
market in particular. The legislation aims at encouraging responsible borrowing, 
avoiding over-indebtedness and discouraging reckless lending.5 A series of 
mechanisms were implemented specifically aimed at preventing consumers of credit 
agreements from becoming over-indebted in the first place.6 The legislation in the 
consumer credit market in both South Africa and the EU ultimately aims at balancing 
the need of protection for consumers from reckless/irresponsible lending practices 
with the legitimate economic interests of credit lenders to make a fair profit. The 
legislation also intends to prevent over-indebtedness without creating insurmountable 
obstacles to access to credit. Striking a balance in the consumer credit legislation, 
which seeks to level the playing field between access to credit and preventing 
reckless/irresponsible lending, however, appears to be immensely hard to achieve. 
This study will examine whether the legislator in the two jurisdictions of South Africa 
and the EU has been able to close the loop in this regard.  
The legislation which intends to create a responsible lending regime and 
safeguard the stability of the financial markets in the EU and South Africa covers a 
wide array of measures, including inter alia the promotion of financial education, 
responsible credit marketing and advertising, the disclosure of adequate information 
in order to enable the consumer to make an informed decision, and interest rate 
control.7 The responsibility to take appropriate measures to promote responsible 
lending practices applies during all phases of the credit relationship.8 Moreover, it 
includes prudential and regulatory measures in the financial sector.9  
																																																						
5 M Kelly-Louw Consumer Credit Regulation in South Africa (2012) 291. 
6 Ibid. 
7 S Renke ‘Measures in South African consumer credit legislation aimed at the prevention of reckless 
lending and over-indebtedness: an overview against the background of recent developments in the 
European Union’ (2011) 74 Journal of Contemporary Roman-Dutch Law 208 at 210 - 212. 
8 Ibid at 211. 
9 Notably, the South African Financial Sector Regulation Act (9 of 2017) which has recently been signed 
by President Jacob Zuma and was published in the Government Gazette on 22 August 2017 (GG Vol. 
626 no 41060 of 22 August 2017). The Act introduces a so-called ‘Twin Peaks’ regulatory model: a 
Prudential Authority, which will supervise the safety and soundness of banks, insurance companies and 
other financial institutions, and a Financial Sector Conduct Authority, which will supervise how 
financial services firms conduct their business and treat customers (Republic of South Africa National 




However, it is important to note that this study is limited in its scope. First, it is 
beyond the scope of this study to consider all the measures that have been implemented 
in order to create a responsible lending regime, especially those that relate to the phase 
after the credit agreement has been concluded. Secondly, the study will not examine 
prudential and regulatory legislation such as the South African ‘Twin Peaks’ 
legislation10 or the European Markets in Financial Instruments Directives (‘MiFID I 
and II’).11 It will rather focus on the implementation of pre-contractual assessments in 
mortgage credit agreements, their content within the legal frameworks of the EU and 
South Africa, and their repercussions on the mortgage credit market. 
The essential pieces of legislation related to the pre-contractual assessment in 
mortgage credit agreements are set out in the Mortgage Credit Directive (hereafter 
‘MCD’)12 of the EU and the South African National Credit Act (hereafter ‘NCA’)13. 
MCD and NCA cover a wide variety of regulations in the credit market. Unlike the 
MCD, however, the NCA is not confined to credit agreements relating to residential 
immovable property but covers a number of credit agreements, including direct 
personal loans, overdrawn cheque accounts, credit cards, the rendering of services, 
sale and lease of movable goods, and credit guarantees.14 
 
1.3 Historical background 
The transition from the Apartheid regime to a democracy in South Africa included a 
plurality of political and economic upheavals. Since 1994, it is the explicit 
governmental aim to redress the inequalities, imbalances, and discriminations of 
Apartheid by giving previously disadvantaged groups of South African citizens equal 
opportunities. As an essential part of this work towards transformation, South Africa 
has made diligent efforts to make the credit market accessible to the low-income and 
historically disadvantaged population.15 Despite the fact that access to credit still 
																																																						
Policy Framework discussion document published for comment’ (2014) at 1-2, available at 
http://www.treasury.gov.za). 
10 For a detailed overview of the Twin Peaks model see, e.g., A Godwin & A Schmulow ‘The Financial 
Sector Regulation Bill in South Africa: Lessons from Australia’ (2015), available at 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2556544. 
11 Directive 2004/39/EC and Directive 2014/65/EU. 
12 Directive 2014/17/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 February 2014 on credit 
agreements for consumers relating to residential immovable property and amending Directives 
2008/48/EC and 2013/36/EU and Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010. 
13 34 of 2005. 
14 JM Otto & R-L Otto The National Credit Act Explained 4th ed. (2016) 17. 
15 M Ellyne & BM Jourdan ‘Did the National Credit Act of 2005 Facilitate a Credit Boom and Bust in 




remains a problem for certain parts of the population, thus hindering progress of the 
national economic transformation and development strategy16, the sudden access to 
the credit market for parts of the population, who previously did not have access to 
credit, led to a vast growth of the South African retail credit market, resulting in a steep 
rise in household debt.17  
The access to the credit market did not exclusively create desirable effects but 
also adversely affected the economy. It is estimated that the size of the South African 
consumer credit market was some R800 billion in 200718 and that the debt-to-
disposable income ratio, used as an indicator for indebtedness, increased sharply from 
2002 to an all-time high by the first quarter of 2008.19 Even before, during the late 
1990s and the early 2000s, the level of over-indebtedness in South Africa increased 
considerably.20 In 2001, the South African Department of Trade and Industry 
(hereafter ‘DTI’), responsible for consumer credit related issues, therefore decided to 
fully review the credit legislation that was in operation at the time, and to examine the 
problems that existed in the consumer credit market.21 The DTI found that the 
operational system suffered a number of problems, inter alia fragmented and outdated 
legislation, ineffective consumer protection, particularly in relation to consumers in 
low-income groups, and reckless behaviour of market participants, in particular 
reckless lending by credit providers.22 Notably, the practices of reckless lending (and 
ruthless collecting) became apparent in the South African micro-lending industry that 
provided credit to consumers particularly from the low-income group.23 Hence, the 
DTI concluded that the operational consumer credit market was dysfunctional. Against 
this backdrop, it does not come as a surprise that South Africa witnessed the collapse 
of two large micro-lenders, the Saambou Bank Limited and the Unibank Limited, in 
																																																						
16 RP Goodwin-Groen & M Kelly-Louw ‘The National Credit Act and its regulations in the context of 
access to finance in South Africa’ (2008) 13, available at http://www.finmark.org.za. 
17 Exact figures on volumes of consumer credit extended in South Africa during the 1990s and early 
2000s, however, are unreliable and incomplete due to the fact that different authorities such as the South 
African Reserve Bank, Statistics SA and the Micro Finance Regulatory Council dealt with bank and 
non-bank credit (M Kelly-Louw ‘The Prevention and Alleviation of Consumer Over-indebtedness’ 
(2008) 20 SA Merc LJ 200) 
18 National Credit Regulator’s Annual Report (2007) 9, available at http://www.ncr.org.za. 
19 Industrial Development Corporation ‘South African economy: An overview of key trends since 1994’ 
(2013) 12, available at http://www.idc.co.za. 
20 M Kelly-Louw op cit note 5 at 13. 
21 Ibid at 3. 
22 Department of Trade and Industry Credit Law Review: Setting the Scene (2004) 1, available at 
http://www.ncr.org.za. 




2002, which highlighted underlying problems in the consumer credit market.24 
Consequently, the problem of over-indebtedness was no longer only considered a 
problem of the individual customer but also recognised as a systemic risk.25 More 
generally, a link was drawn between the financial decisions taken and the overall well-
being of national economies.26 
Dysfunctional credit markets and high levels of over-indebtedness are 
admittedly not unique features of South Africa’s financial sector. In the last part of the 
first decade of the twenty-first century, the devastating effects of the over-extension 
of credit27 have been experienced on the global level with what is known as the global 
financial crisis. The global financial crisis took place in a context of largely liberalised 
credit markets and relaxed financial regulation.28 The years before the crisis saw a 
flood of irresponsible mortgage lending, especially in the U.S. mortgage credit market, 
in an environment which enabled market conduct such as the spreading of risk through 
securitisation, including trading in residential mortgage-backed securities.29 The 
global financial crisis not only led to massive bail-outs of financial institutions and an 
overall global economic downturn but also resulted in an increased number of credit 
defaults and forced sales of residential immovable property. The severe consequences 
of the financial crisis could also be felt in South Africa, where 2 million people 
experienced difficulties in meeting their financial commitments and more than 
200,000 were in arrears on their mortgages.30 
Many causes of the financial crisis have been suggested. Although the global 
financial crisis cannot be ascribed to any single factor – it was rather caused by a 
complex interplay of policies, market behaviour and other conditions – irresponsible 
behaviour by market participants was identified as one of the main causes that 
triggered the financial crisis. It is said that the worldwide economic meltdown during 
2008 was the expensive price that credit providers and consumers had to pay for their 
																																																						
24 South African Reserve Bank – Bank Supervision Department Annual Report (2002) 8, available at 
https://www.resbank.co.za. 
25 Department of Trade and Industry Credit Law Review August 2003: Summary of findings of the 
Technical Committee (2003) 4, available at http://www.ncr.org.za. 
26 G Pearson G, PN Stoop & M Kelly-Louw ‘Balancing Responsibilities – Financial Literacy’ (2017) 
20 PER/PELJ 3. 
27 JM Otto & R-L Otto op cit note 14 at 2. 
28 S Claessens & L Kodres ‘The Regulatory Responses to the Global Financial Crisis: Some 
Uncomfortable Questions’ (2014) 6, available at https://www.imf.org. 
29 T Wilson ‘Credit and Over-indebtedness: Current Context, Regulatory Responses and Future 
Possibilities’ in T Wilson (ed) International responses to issues of credit and over-indebtedness in the 
wake of crisis (2013) 3. 





irresponsible behaviour.31 As pointed out above, the prevention of over-indebtedness 
and the creation of a responsible lending regime therefore became core points of the 
international responses in the wake of the crisis. Moreover, it was the financial crisis 
and the important role that the mortgage credit market played therein, that had the 
greatest impact on the awareness of the need for a common legal framework for 
mortgage credit agreements in the EU. The sub-prime lending disaster in the U.S. 
served as a reminder for the fact that there was a gap in EU-wide legislation applicable 
to mortgage credit agreements – despite accounting for the lion’s share of the 
indebtedness of European households.32 
 
1.4 Problem statement and research objective 
‘Responsible lending’ and ‘responsible credit regime’ are policy terms that describe a 
whole range of regulatory measures or tools.33 The agenda behind those terms is the 
need to balance several financial sector policy objectives: financial inclusion, stability 
and integrity of the financial sector, and consumer protection.34 Within this 
framework, the pre-contractual (affordability) assessment plays a pivotal role in the 
creation of a responsible credit regime and in the prevention of irresponsible/reckless 
lending. It is safe to say that the legislative intent of creating a responsible mortgage 
credit regime and preventing reckless lending is of considerable importance for market 
participants (consumers, credit providers, and credit intermediaries) and regulators 
alike. Depending on the respective legal perspective, however, one can identify 
different approaches: The regulatory viewpoint would stress the importance of a 
responsible mortgage credit regime for the systemic integrity of the mortgage credit 
market and the financial market as a whole (‘regulatory approach’). From the 
perspective of the consumer as an individual, on the other hand, the emphasis would 
be on the accessibility to credit and the protection against irresponsible market conduct 
of credit providers and intermediaries (‘consumer protection approach’). The latter 
approach appears to be of particular importance in South Africa, bearing in mind that 
the South African Constitution35, unlike other Constitutions, explicitly provides a 
																																																						
31 H Coetzee ‘The impact of the National Credit Act on civil procedural aspects relating to debt 
enforcement’ (2009) 1. 
32 H-J Dübel & M Rothemund ‘A New Mortgage Credit Regime for Europe: Setting the Right Priorities’ 
(2011) 1, Center for European Policy Studies/European Credit Research Institute, EPS Special Report, 
available at http://www.ceps.eu/book/new-mortgage-credit-regime-europe-setting-right-priorities. 
33 V Mak op cit note 2 at 413. 
34 World Bank 2013 op cit note 3 at 8. 




justiciable right of access to housing36 and, more generally, pursues socially and 
politically transformative objectives, with a Preamble pointed towards the 
achievement of social justice.37  
In light of the above, the research objective of the study is as follows: By means 
of comparative analysis, the dissertation firstly aims at providing an overview of the 
European and the South African responsible credit regime with a special emphasis on 
the pre-contractual assessment in mortgage credit agreements, and thereby legally 
defining the policy term of ‘responsible credit’ in the contexts of mortgage credit 
agreements in Europe and South Africa. The study will consider and duly compare the 
pre-contractual assessment provisions that have been implemented in order to create a 
responsible (mortgage) credit regime in South Africa and the EU. The purpose of the 
comparison is to reveal if it can be inferred from the NCA and the MCD that 
international best practices have emerged as regards pre-contractual assessments in the 
mortgage credit market and to identify potential shortcomings of the pre-contractual 
assessment in the two jurisdictions under consideration in this study. 
On the basis of the comparative part, the study will secondly have a closer look 
at the actual or potential repercussions of the legislative attempt to create a responsible 
credit regime. In recent years, scholars have expressed the concern that a responsible 
credit regime in general and pre-contractual affordability assessments in particular 
necessarily lead to restrictive lending practices, especially in the mortgage credit 
market, which exacerbate financial exclusion.38 Consumer protection imperatives, it is 
further argued, have ‘to some extent been hijacked by a “financial stability” 
imperative, looking to the protection of markets rather than people’.39 Furthermore, 
the current legal frameworks in South Africa and the EU as regards the responsible 
(mortgage) credit regime have been criticised for effectively focusing on irresponsible 
borrowing instead of irresponsible lending, holding the customer rather than the credit 
provider responsible for irresponsible market behaviour.40 The legal frameworks in the 
EU and South Africa thus have been criticised for levelling the playing field of 
consumer protection and the access to credit on the one hand versus economic interests 
																																																						
36 Section 26 of the Constitution. 
37 P de Vos ‘Grootboom, The right of Access to Housing and Substantive Equality as Contextual 
Fairness’ (2001) 17 SAJHR 271. However, the focus of the minor dissertation is not on a constitutional 
examination of whether or not the provisions of the NCA might be inconsistent with the South African 
Constitution. 






of credit providers and financial stability on the other to the detriment of the consumer. 
By contrast, pre-contractual assessments have been lauded for gaining traction over 
income benchmarks, giving more consumers access to credit. Drawing on the findings 
of the comparison between the MCD and the NCA, the study aims at scrutinising 
whether the provisions of the NCA and the MCD support the assumption that pre-
contractual assessments in mortgage loans make credit more accessible or – conversely 
– exacerbate financial exclusion.  
 
1.5 Structure of the minor dissertation 
The structure of the minor dissertation is as follows. The study is divided into five 
chapters to meet the research objectives. Following the introduction, the study 
provides an outline of the NCA and MCD (chapter 2). Subsequently, the study will 
specifically compare the pre-contractual assessment in mortgage agreements under the 
NCA and the MCD, taking into account the prevention of irresponsible/reckless 
lending by means of pre-contractual assessments and the consequences and sanctions 
for reckless lending (chapter 3). Based on the findings in chapter 3, the study will 
examine some actual or alleged effects pertaining to pre-contractual assessments in 
South Africa and the EU at the crossroads between responsible lending and financial 
exclusion (chapter 4). The final chapter 5 contains the conclusions reached in this 
study. 
 
Chapter 2: The National Credit Act and the Mortgage Credit 
Directive 
 
1.1 History of the National Credit Act 
As stated above, the DTI decided to fully review the operational credit consumer 
legislation in 2001 and to examine the problems that existed in the consumer credit 
market. Accordingly, the DTI initiated an in-depth legal-comparative research project 
in order to identify the problems that were being experienced in the credit market.41 
The research project ultimately resulted in the NCA, which came into full effective 
operation on 1 June 200742 and provides the regulatory framework for the South 
																																																						
41 M Kelly-Louw op cit note 5 at 3. 
42 The NCA was assented to by the President on 10 March 2006 and came into effect incrementally on 
1 June 2006, 1 September 2006 and 1 June 2007: See Proc 22 of 2006 in Government Gazette 28864 of 




African credit market. In enacting the NCA, the South African legislature addressed a 
number of problems that have been identified in the ‘Policy Framework for Consumer 
Credit’43 (‘Policy Framework’) in respect of the legislative framework that preceded 
the National Credit Act.44 The drafters of the Policy Framework came to the 
conclusion that the consumer credit legislation current at the time45 was ineffective, 
providing ‘no effective protection against over-indebtedness’.46 Over-indebtedness, in 
turn, was inter alia attributed to reckless lending and borrowing, low levels of 
awareness, and a lack of enforcement.47 The Policy Framework therefore stated that 
‘reckless credit extension will be curbed by introducing a general requirement that all 
credit providers should do affordability assessments prior to approving any credit 
facility’.48 
The NCA brought about far-reaching changes in the South African consumer 
credit market and introduced new measures aimed at preventing ‘reckless credit 
granting’ and ‘over-indebtedness’. Both terms were previously not addressed under 
the NCA’s predecessors, the Usury Act49 and the Credit Agreements Act50 and were, 
thus, conceptually new to the South African consumer credit legislation.51 In Nedbank 
Ltd and Others v National Credit Regulator and Another52, Malan JA consequently 
pointed out that the NCA is not simply an amendment of the previous legislation53 but 
rather represents a clean break and bears very little resemblance to its predecessors.54 
Although the NCA has been described as more user-friendly and better worded 
than the previous legislation55, the Act faced harsh criticism. Malan JA in Nedbank 
Ltd v National Credit Regulator56 complained that ‘[n]umerous drafting errors, untidy 
																																																						
systems, contract documents and other forms in place and to attend their registration as credit providers 
(JM Otto & R-L Otto op cit note 14 at 8). 
43 Policy Framework 2004 op cit note 1. The Policy Framework 2004 formed the basis upon which the 
NCA was drafted. 
44 C van Heerden & S Renke ‘Perspectives on the South African Responsible Lending Regime and the 
Duty to Conduct Pre-agreement Assessment as a Responsible Lending Practice’ (2015) 24 INSOL 67 
at 71. 
45 As set out in the provisions of the Credit Agreements Act 75 of 1980, the Usury Act 73 of 1968 and 
the exemption notice in terms of the Usury Act. 
46 Policy Framework (2004) op cit note 1 at 30. 
47 Ibid at 31. 
48 Ibid. 
49 73 of 1968. 
50 75 of 1980. 
51 C van Heerden & S Renke op cit note 44 at 72. 
52 Nedbank Ltd and Others v National Credit Regulator and Another 2011 (3) SA 581 (SCA). 
53 Ibid para 1. 
54 JM Otto & R-L Otto op cit note 14 at 3. 
55 Ibid at 5. 




expressions and inconsistencies make its57 interpretation a particularly trying 
exercise.’58 Following criticisms from the judicial and academic side and due to 
practical problems in the application of the NCA, the DTI published the draft National 
Credit Act Policy Review Framework and the draft National Credit Amendment Bill 
in the Government Gazette.59 
Subsequently, the NCA was amended in 2014 by the National Credit 
Amendment Act (hereafter ‘NCAA’)60 that rectified some of the NCA’s shortcomings. 
On 19 May 2014, the NCAA was assented by the President, Mr Jacob Zuma.61 The 
amendments subject to the NCAA became effective and operational on 13 March 
2015.62 The amendments included inter alia changes in certain definitions of credit 
agreements in the Act, in the field of application of the Act, as well as in the fields of 
reckless credit, unlawful agreements, debt review and debt enforcement.63 
 
1.2 Main objectives of the National Credit Act 
The NCA contains a number of purposes that are set out in Section 3 and are also 
reflected in the preamble to the Act. The purposes of the Act are ‘to promote and 
advance the social and economic welfare of South Africans, promote a fair, 
transparent, competitive, sustainable, responsible, efficient, effective and accessible 
credit market and industry, and to protect consumers’.64 Another one of its key objects 
is to create a single system of consumer credit regulation and a National Credit 
Regulator to administer the consumer credit industry.65 
The Act aims to achieve its objectives inter alia by ‘promoting the development 
of a credit market that is accessible to all South Africans, particularly to those who 
have historically been unable to access credit under sustainable market conditions’66, 
‘promoting responsibility in the credit market by (i) encouraging responsible 
borrowing, fulfilment of financial obligations by consumers and avoidance of over-
indebtedness; and (ii) discouraging reckless credit granting by credit providers, and 
																																																						
57 i.e. the NCA’s. 
58 For more examples of those critics see JM Otto ‘National Credit Act. Vanwaar Gehási? Quo vadis 
lex? And some reflections on the National Credit Amendment Act 2014 (part 1)’ 2015 TSAR 585. 
59 GG Vol. 575 no 36504 & 36050 of 29 May 2013. 
60 19 of 2014.  
61 GG Vol. 587 no 37665 of 20 May 2014.  
62 Green Gazette no 38557 of 13 March 2015. 
63 JM Otto op cit note 58 at 587. 
64 Section 3. 
65 M Kelly-Louw op cit note 5 at 20. 
66 Section 3(a) NCA. Section 2(6) provides who is considered to be a historically disadvantaged person 




contractual default by consumers’67, and ‘addressing and correcting imbalances in 
negotiating power between consumers and credit providers’68. 
The purposes of the Act as set out in section 3 are not of declaratory effect only. 
Section 2(1) of the NCA rather provides that each time the Act is interpreted it must 
be done in a way that gives effect to the purposes set out in section 3.69 
Although the Act, in essence, aims to improve the protection offered to the 
consumers of credit, consumer protection is not the Act’s sole or predominant 
purpose.70 In Standard Bank SA Ltd v Hales and Another71, the KwaZulu-Natal High 
Court, Durban, held that section 3 of the NCA lists a number of purposes without 
providing any prioritisation.72 It can therefore be inferred that the protection of 
consumers cannot be the sole purpose of the NCA nor can be said that it is the Act’s 
chief purpose. Likewise, Willis J said in FirstRand Bank Ltd t/a First National Bank 
v Seyffert73 that ‘it is clear from reading section 3 of the NCA, which sets out the 
purposes of the Act, that it pursues varied objectives which must be held in balance. 
Certainly, the NCA is designed to protect consumers, but it was not intended to make 
of South Africa a “debtor’s paradise”.’74 In general, it can rather be said that the 
various purposes of the Act as set out in section 3 aim at striking a balance between 
consumer protection, financial stability of the credit market and the legitimate interests 
of credit providers. 
 
1.3 Application and scope of the National Credit Act 
As stated above, the NCA has a broad scope of application. The NCA generally 
regulates all kinds of consumer credit whether it is, e.g., in the form of home loans, 
direct personal loans, vehicle and asset finance, study loans or clothing store 
accounts.75 Section 8(1) of the NCA identifies four main types of credit agreements to 
which the Act applies. They are credit facilities76, credit transactions77, credit 
																																																						
67 Section 3(c) NCA. 
68 Section 3(e) NCA. 
69 M Kelly-Louw op cit note 5 at 23. 
70 M Kelly-Louw op cit note 5 at 20; Rossouw and Another v FirstRand Bank Ltd 2010 (6) SA 439 
(SCA). 
71 Standard Bank SA Ltd v Hales and Another 2009 (3) SA 315 (D). 
72 Ibid para 13. 
73 FirstRand Bank Ltd t/a First National Bank v Seyffert 2010 (6) SA 429 (GSJ). 
74 Ibid para 10. 
75 M Kelly-Louw op cit note 5 at 28. 
76 Defined in section 8(3). 




guarantees78 and credit agreements that are a combination of the afore-mentioned 
types. The NCA further deals with developmental credit agreements and public 
interest credit agreements subject to sections 10 and 11 of the NCA. 
Section 4(1) of the NCA provides that the Act applies to every credit agreement 
between parties dealing at arm’s length and made within, or having an effect within, 
the Republic of South Africa. The definition of ‘dealing at arm’s length’ is a negative 
one, i.e., the Act sets out arrangements in respect whereof it is considered that parties 
to a credit agreement are not dealing at arm’s length (section 4(2)(b)), e.g., in case of 
a shareholder loan or a credit agreement between natural persons who are in a familial 
relationship and are co-dependent on each other or one is dependent upon the other.79 
However, the list provided in section 4(2)(b) is not exhaustive. Therefore, any 
arrangement of a type that has been held in law to be between parties who are not 
dealing at arm’s length will not be an arm’s length transaction for purposes of the 
NCA.80 
The NCA does not apply to credit agreements in certain circumstances listed in 
section 4(1)(a) - (d) and is limited in its scope of application subject to section 5 and 
6 of the NCA. It is beyond the scope of this study to consider each of the exclusions 
and limitations of the scope of application separately.81 For the purposes of this study 
it is, however, important to note that ‘a juristic person whose asset value or annual 
turnover, together with the combined asset value or annual turnover of all related 
juristic persons, atthe time the agreement is made, equals or exceeds’82 a certain 
threshold determined by the Minister83 in terms of section 7(1) of the NCA, currently 
R1,000,00084, will not come under the ambit of the NCA. Conversely, juristic persons 
whose asset value or annual turnover is below this threshold – commonly referred to 
as ‘small’ juristic persons or businesses – do, in general, enjoy the protection of the 
NCA.85 Certain parts of the NCA, however, only apply to credit agreements where the 
consumer is an individual (a natural person). This is inter alia true for the provisions 
																																																						
78 Defined in section 8(5). 
79 M Kelly-Louw op cit note 5 at 29. 
80 Ibid at 31. 
81 For further reading see M Kelly-Louw op cit note 5 at 32 et seq. 
82 Section 4(1)(a)(i) of the NCA. 
83 Minister meaning the member of the Cabinet responsible for consumer credit matters (section 1 of 
the NCA). Cabinet, in turn, means the Cabinet referred to in section 91 of the Constitution. 
84 See section 4(1)(a)(i) read with section 6 of the NCA and GenN 713 in GG Vol. 492 no 28893 of 1 
June 2006 at 3. 




of Chapter 4 Part D of the NCA dealing with over-indebtedness and reckless credit.86 
A juristic person is therefore barred from raising the issue of reckless credit or over-
indebtedness. 
In Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd v Hunkydory Investments and Another 194 
(Pty) Ltd (No 1)87, the question was raised whether the provisions of sections 4(1)(a) 
and 4(1)(b) of the NCA are unconstitutional insofar as they provide that the Act does 
not apply to a juristic person. The defendants argued that these provisions infringed 
their constitutional right to equality as found in section 9(1) of the Constitution.88 The 
court pointed out that where the impugned provisions differentiate between people or 
categories of people, there must be, in the first place, a rational connection between 
the differentiation in question and the legitimate governmental purpose it is designed 
to further or achieve in order not to fall foul of the equality provisions of the 
Constitution.89 In the given case, the court held that there was such a rational 
connection. It found that in essence, the NCA ‘attempts to prevent the reckless 
provision of credit by institutions to persons who cannot afford the credit’ and 
concluded that it was evident that there was ‘a rational connection between the 
differentiation created by the relevant provisions of section 4 of the National Credit 
Act and the legitimate governmental purpose behind its enactment’.90 Furthermore, 
the court found that the differentiation did not amount to unfair discrimination.91 
 
1.4 Mortgage agreement under the National Credit Act 
The NCA initially defined a mortgage agreement as a credit agreement that is ‘secured 
by a pledge of immovable property’.92 This definition was harshly criticised even 
before the NCA was enacted.93 Taking into account that under common law rules only 
movable property can be pledged, one had to perforce interpret ‘pledge of immovable 
property’ as meaning ‘registration of a bond over immovable property’.94 The NCAA 
																																																						
86 Section 6(a) of the NCA. Other provisions that only apply to credit agreements where the consumer 
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87 Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd v Hunkydory Investments and Another 194 (Pty) Ltd (No 1) 2010 
(1) SA 627 (C). 
88 Ibid para 18. 
89 Ibid para 22. 
90 Ibid para 20 and 25. 
91 Ibid para 25. 
92 Section 1 of the NCA. 
93 JM Otto referred to the definition of ‘mortgage agreement’ as a monstrosity (JM Otto & R-L Otto op 
cit note 14 at 22). 




of 2014 tried to address the inaccuracy as pointed out above. Pursuant to the NCAA, 
a mortgage is now defined as a ‘mortgage bond registered by the registrar of deeds 
over immovable property that serves as continuing covering security for a mortgage 
agreement’.95 However, JM Otto correctly points out that the wording ‘continuing 
covering security’ is misleading and unnecessary. This creates the impression that a 
mortgage for purposes of the NCA is a covering bond, that is to say a bond securing 
future debts. According to JM Otto, however, the courts should interpret the definition 
as including an ‘ordinary’ mortgage bond, that is a mortgage bond where the credit is 
in existence from day one.96 A mortgage agreement is in turn defined as ‘a credit 
agreement that is secured by the registration of a mortgage bond by the registrar of 
deeds over immovable property’.97 A classic example of a mortgage agreement will 
be a housing loan.98  
The NCA classifies credit agreements in three categories: Section 9(1) provides 
that for purposes of the Act, every credit agreement is characterised as a small, 
intermediate, or large agreement, as described in subsections (2) to (4) respectively. 
Pursuant to section 9(4), a mortgage agreement is regarded a large agreement, 
irrespective of the principle debt involved.99 The categorisation is made in order to 
subdivide the consumer credit market by size and to facilitate effective regulation.100 
The type of category a specific credit agreement falls into has significance in different 
respects. Firstly, the different types of credit agreements require different pre-
agreement disclosure statements and quotations that need to be made.101 Secondly, the 
format in which credit agreements must be delivered to the consumer differs from 
category to category.102 Thirdly, to exclude the application of the NCA where a juristic 
																																																						
95 Section 1(d) of the NCAA. 
96 JM Otto & R-L Otto op cit note 14 at 27. 
97 Section 1(e) of the NCAA. 
98 Section 1 of the Home Loan and Mortgage Disclosure Act 63 of 2000 defines a housing loan as a 
loan or advance by a financial institution to a person for purposes of constructing, purchasing, 
renovating or improving in any way such person’s home with the security of a registered mortgage bond 
or any other form of accepted security (M Kelly-Louw op cit note 5 at 72). 
99 A credit agreement is a small agreement if it is pawn transaction or if a credit facility or credit 
transaction (excluding a mortgage agreement) if below the threshold of R15,000 (Section 9(2) read with 
GN 713 in GG Vol. 492 no 28893 of 1 June 2006 at 3). An intermediate credit agreement is a credit 
facility or credit transaction (excluding a pawn transaction or mortgage) of between R15,000 and 
R250,000 (Section 9(3) read with GN 713 in GG Vol. 492 no 28893 of 1 June 2006 at 3). Besides a 
mortgage agreement, a credit facility or credit transaction (excluding a pawn transaction) is considered 
a large agreement if the transaction value is equal to or more than R250,000 (Section 9(4) read with GN 
713 in GG Vol. 492 no 28893 of 1 June 2006 at 3). 
100 M Kelly-Louw op cit note 5 at 93. 
101 Section 92 and regs 28 and 29 in GN R489 in GG Vol. 491 no 28864 of 31 May 2006 (see M Kelly-





person103 with an asset value or annual turnover, at the time the agreement is made, 
below R1,000,000, concludes a large credit agreement.104 The NCA therefore only 
protects (in a limited way) small juristic persons who enter into small or intermediate 
credit agreements.105 Hence, a (small) juristic person cannot raise the defence of 
reckless credit or over-indebtedness as regards a mortgage agreement for two reasons: 
Firstly, because the provisions relating to reckless credit and over-indebtedness106 will 
not apply in cases where the consumer is a juristic person.107 Secondly, because a 
mortgage agreement is considered a large agreement irrespective of the principle debt 
involved and the NCA will not apply to a large credit agreement concluded by a (small) 
juristic person.108 
 
2.1 History of the Mortgage Credit Directive 
The consumer credit market has long been regulated in the EU, in particular by the 
Council Directive 87/102/EEC109, and more recently by its successor, the Consumer 
Credit Directive 2008/48 (‘CCD’)110. Yet mortgage credit and high-value credit 
agreements were excluded from the CCD’s scope111, which led to a significant gap in 
EU consumer protection law applicable to mortgage credit agreements.112 The MCD, 
published in the Official Journal of the Commission on 28 February 2014, with a 
transposition date of 21 March 2016113, seeks to remedy this, pointing out that ‘[a]  
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FirstRand Bank Ltd v Carl Beck Estates (Pty) Ltd and Another 2009 (3) SA 384 (T); Structured 
Mezzanine Investments (Pty) Ltd v Davids and Others 2010 (6) SA 622 (WCC). 
105 M Kelly-Louw op cit note 5 at 37. 
106 Sections 78 - 88 of the NCA. 
107 See chapter 2 para 1.3 above. 
108 Section 4(1)(b) of the NCA. 
109 Council Directive 87/102/EEC of 22 December 1986 for the approximation of the laws, regulations 
and administrative provisions of the Member States concerning consumer credit. 
110 Directive 2008/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2008 on credit 
agreements for consumers and repealing Council Directive 87/102/EEC. 
111 Article 2(2)(a) and (c) of the CCD. Member States may, however, in accordance with the law of the 
EU, decide to apply the Directive to credit agreements not covered by its scope. A Member State could 
thereby maintain or introduce national legislation corresponding to the provisions of the Directive or 
certain of its provisions on credit agreements outside the scope of the Directive, for instance on 
mortgage credit agreements or high value credit agreements (see recital 10 of the CCD). 
112 This, however, does not mean that mortgage agreements and the mortgage credit market have not 
been regulated in the European Member States prior to the MCD. Rather, the Member States had 28 
different frameworks for mortgages and mortgage credits that each functioned separately and 
independently (T Josipovic ‘Consumer Protection in EU Residential Mortgage Markets: Common EU 
Rules on Mortgage Credit in the Mortgage Credit Directive’ (2014) 16 Cambridge Yearbook of 
European Legal Studies 224). 





series of problems have been identified in mortgage markets within the Union relating 
to irresponsible lending and borrowing’114 and irresponsible behaviour by market 
participants ‘can undermine the foundations of the financial system, leading to a lack 
of confidence among all parties, in particular consumers, and potentially severe social 
and economic consequences.’115 
The MCD is the end of a long consultative and legislative journey.116 As long 
ago as 1985, the European Commission drafted the first Proposal for a Directive on 
the freedom of establishment and the free supply of services in the field of mortgage 
credit.117 The proposal, however, was not adopted at the time, and it was not until 2001 
that the next step on the way towards a higher level of integration of mortgage credit 
markets within the European financial market was taken. In March 2001, the 
Commission published the Commission Recommendation on pre-contractual 
information to be given to consumers by lenders offering home loans118, that resulted 
in the European agreement on a voluntary code on pre-contractual information for 
home loans.119 The consultative process towards a common legal framework for 
mortgage credit agreements went further in March 2003 with the establishment of a 
Forum Group on mortgage credit.120 In July 2005, the European Commission 
published a Green Paper on Mortgage Credit in the EU121, following the 
recommendations of the Forum Group. The Green Paper examined the case for 
Commission action, looking at whether and how Commission action to develop the 
single market in mortgages could enhance efficiency and competitiveness and provide 
concrete benefits for EU consumers.122 Subsequently, the Commission continued its 
analysis of the EU mortgage market and published the White Paper on the Integration 
																																																						
114 Recital 4 of the MCD. 
115 Recital 3 of the MCD. 
116 For a detailed chronology of events see the Commission Staff Working Paper Impact Assessment 
Accompanying document to the Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council 
on credit agreements relating to residential property COM(2011) 142 of 31 March 2011 at 51, available 
at http://www.eur-lex.europa.eu. 
117 EU Commission Proposal for a Directive on the freedom of establishment and the free supply of 
services in the field of mortgage credit COM(84) 730 of 7 February 1985, available at 
http://aei.pitt.edu/8826/. 
118 EU Commission Commission Recommendation of 1 March 2001 on pre-contractual information to 
be given to consumers by lenders offering home loans [2001] OJ L69/25. 
119 Agreement on the Code of Conduct and Register of Institutions adhering to the European Code are 
available at http://www.ec.europa.eu. 
120 A detailed chronology of events is displayed in the Commission Staff Working Paper Impact 
Assessment Accompanying document to the Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and 
of the Council on credit agreements relating to residential property op cit note 116 at 51. 
121 EU Commission Green Paper on Mortgage Credit in the EU COM(2005) 327 of 19 July 2005, 





of EU Mortgage Credit Markets123 on 18 December 2007. The paper summarised the 
conclusions of a comprehensive review of European residential mortgage markets, and 
identified a package of proportionate measures designed to enhance the 
competitiveness and efficiency of EU mortgage markets.124 The White Paper already 
referred to measures to protect consumers in mortgage credit markets at the time of 
the commencing global financial crisis. 
The wording of the MCD itself is the result of several years of discussions on 
the Proposal for a Directive on credit agreements relating to residential property125 
of 2011.126 However, in the course of the discussion in the European Parliament, 
almost every provision in the proposal was amended and expanded127 and special 
emphasis was put on consumer protection in terms of protection against over-
indebtedness and on the establishment of a system to create a responsible credit 
regime.128 
As pointed out before, the MCD had to be transposed into national law before 
21 March 2016. The European Commission closely monitors and enforces 
transposition. It verifies if transpositions are correct and complete, and takes action if 
necessary to ensure proper transposition.129 The transposition status for the MCD, 
provided on the website of the Commission130, shows that 26 Member States have 
communicated full transposition, while two Member States – Croatia and Spain – have 
still not transposed the MCD (by the end of September 2017). Furthermore, 
infringement proceedings are pending against 20 Member States due to the lack or 
delay of the notification of national transposition measures or their incompleteness.131 
 
2.2 Main objectives of the Mortgage Credit Directive 
The MCD first and foremost aims at consumer protection, particularly ensuring that 
all consumers who take out a mortgage to purchase a property are adequately informed 
																																																						
123 EU Commission White Paper on the Integration of EU Mortgage Credit Markets COM(2007) 807 
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124 Ibid. 
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126 T Josipovic op cit note 112 at 235. 
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and protected against the risks. However, the objectives that form the basis of the MCD 
go beyond consumer protection. The MCD is also designed to provide for a more 
integrated internal European mortgage market132 and aims at the promotion of stability 
in the financial market. 
On a more detailed level, the main objectives of the MCD can be summarised as 
follows: (a) establishment of a high level of consumer protection; (b) creation of a 
responsible mortgage credit regime, including the prevention of irresponsible lending 
and borrowing, of unaffordable loans, and of defaults, foreclosures and eviction; (c) 
establishment of an efficient and competitive single market for the benefit of 
consumers, creditors, and credit intermediaries; (d) establishment of business and 
conduct principles, ensuring that creditors and credit intermediaries (i.e. persons or 
companies providing information and assistance to consumers looking for a mortgage 
loan) act honestly and transparently in the consumer’s interests, and provide a high 
level of professionalism (ensuring that their staff have the necessary and latest 
knowledge on loan agreements and that customers are provided with all the necessary 
information before signing any agreement); (e) introduction of a passport regime of 
credit intermediaries133; (f) promotion of financial stability on the internal market.134 
While the MCD does not create a certain order of priority between its different 
objectives, it is clear from the EU initiatives and the legislative procedure that the most 
significant emphasis is placed on improving consumer confidence, increasing 
consumer protection and facilitating mobility to establish a single mortgage credit 
market.135 Importantly, the MCD does not aim at full harmonisation of the European 
mortgage credit market, ‘taking into account the specificity of credit agreements 
relating to immovable property and differences in market developments and conditions 
in Member States, concerning in particular market structure and market participants, 
categories of products available and procedures involved in the credit granting 
process’.136 Rather, the MCD requires minimum harmonisation, which does not 
generally restrict Member States from maintaining or introducing more stringent 
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Housing Finance International 11. 
133 Essentially, this means that in principle once authorised in one EU country, a credit intermediary is 
allowed to provide services throughout the EU, which, in turn, is linked to the Directive’s objective of 
establishing a single European mortgage credit market.  
134 T Josipovic op cit note 112 at 237. 
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provisions in order to protect consumers.137 The concept of minimum harmonisation 
therefore leaves it largely to the discretion of the member states how to transpose the 
requirements established by the MCD. However, there are two exceptions to this rule 
of minimum harmonisation pursuant to Article 2(2) MCD: (a) Member States shall not 
maintain or introduce in their national law provisions diverging from those laid down 
in Article 14(2) and Annex II Part A MCD with regard to standard pre-contractual 
information through a European Standardised Information Sheet (ESIS), which 
consumers have to receive before signing a credit agreement; and (b) the pre-
contractual information has to include the so-called annual percentage rate of charge 
(APRC), which is an effective interest rate that is calculated according to a common, 
consistent EU standard as set out in Article 17(1) to (5), (7) and (8) and Annex I MCD.  
 
2.3 Application and scope of the Mortgage Credit Directive 
The material scope of application of the MCD is defined by Article 3(1) of the MCD. 
The MCD only applies (a) to credit agreements which are secured either by a mortgage 
or by another comparable security commonly used in a Member State on residential 
immovable property or secured by a right related to residential immovable property; 
and (b) credit agreements the purpose of which is to acquire or retain property rights 
in land or in an existing or projected building.138 In this regard, the scope of application 
of the MCD is much narrower than the one of the NCA that applies to a variety of 
credit agreements in the consumer credit market.139 
Regarding the personal scope of application, the MCD encompasses consumers. 
Article 1 of the MCD states that the Directive ‘lays down a common framework for 
certain aspects of the laws, regulations and administrative provisions of the Member 
States concerning agreements covering credit for consumers secured by a mortgage or 
otherwise relating to residential immovable property’. Article 4(3) defines a credit 
agreement as ‘an agreement whereby a creditor grants or promises to grant, to a 
consumer, a credit falling within the scope of Article 3 in the form of a deferred 
payment, loan or other similar financial accommodation’. Although the MCD itself 
does not contain any express limitation as regards juristic persons, it becomes clear 
from these provisions as well as Article 4(1) of the MCD that the Directive applies to 
natural persons only. Article 4(1) of the MCD provides that for the purposes of the 
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Directive, ‘consumer’ is defined as in Article 3(a) of the CCD. According to Article 
3(a) of the CCD, a ‘consumer’ is considered to be a natural person who, in transactions 
covered by the Directive, is acting for the purposes which are outside his [or her] trade, 
business or profession.140 Under the law of the EU, the notion of consumer does not 
extend to legal persons, even if they have a non-business character (e.g. non-profit 
associations).141 Accordingly, the MCD limits its statutory protection to natural 
persons. The notion of ‘consumer’ therefore significantly differs from the 
understanding of the term in the context of the South African NCA, which, in general, 
encompasses both natural persons and small juristic persons or businesses.142 
Moreover, unlike the NCA, the MCD only applies to consumers ‘acting for purposes 
which are outside his [or her] trade, business or profession’. However, in the case of 
dual purpose contracts, i.e. contracts that are concluded for purposes partly within and 
partly outside the person’s trade, business or profession and the trade, business or 
professional purpose is so limited as not to be predominant in the overall context of 
the contract, that person should also be considered as a consumer.143 
																																																						
140 The notion of ‘consumer’ and ‘consumer protection’ is a key concept under the law of the EU. Article 
38 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU (2002/C 326/391) states that the Union policies shall 
ensure a high level of consumer protection. The European treaties since the Single European Act (SEA) 
seek to guarantee a high level of consumer protection in the EU. It is also a general objective defined 
in Article 12 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU (Consolidated versions of the Treaty on 
European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 2012/C 326/01, hereafter 
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certain circumstances (E Hondius ‘The Notion of Consumer: European Union versus Member States’ 
(2006) 28 Sydney Law Review 89 at 96). This structural asymmetry, it is argued, applies to the same or 
at least a similar extent to a small business person that has no expertise on many commercial issues. 
However, the European legislator has so far abstained from including small businesses in the consumer 
protection legislation, mainly because of the difficulties where to draw the line between ‘small’ and 
‘big’ businesses (Ibid at 96). 
141 R Manko ‘The notion of “consumer” in EU law’ (2013), available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu. 
142 See chapter 2 para 1.3 above. 
143 Recital 12 of the MCD. It does not come as a surprise that this may lead to serious difficulties in 
demarcation on whether a purpose is predominantly outside a person’s trade, business or profession or 
not (see, e.g. the judgment of the European Court of Justice in Johann Gruber v Bay Wa AG C–464/01 




The MCD explicitly excludes certain agreements from its scope144 such as credit 
agreements where the credit is granted free of interest and without any other charges 
except those that recover costs directly related to the securing of the credit145 or credit 
agreements in the form of an overdraft facility where the credit has to be repaid within 
a month.146 Moreover, the MCD leaves member states discretion to opt-out of certain 
provisions of the MCD and to exclude certain types of credit agreements from the 
scope of the MCD such as bridging loans.147 
Lastly, regarding the temporal scope, the MCD shall not apply to credit 
agreements existing before 21 March 2016 according to Article 42(2) of the MCD.  
 
2.4 Mortgage agreement under the Mortgage Credit Directive 
Unlike the NCA, the MCD does not contain a definition of ‘mortgage’, ‘mortgage 
agreement’, or ‘mortgage credit agreement’. The understanding of a mortgage (credit) 
agreement under the MCD is rather determined by its scope. According to Article 1 of 
the MCD, the subject matter of the Directive relates to ‘agreements covering credit for 
consumers secured by a mortgage or otherwise relating to residential immovable 
property’. As stated above, the MCD shall apply to (a) agreements which are secured 
either by a mortgage or by another comparable security commonly used in a Member 
State on residential immovable property148 or secured by a right related to residential 
immovable property; and (b) credit agreements the purpose of which is to acquire or 
retain property rights in land or in an existing or projected building. When the MCD 
speaks of ‘credit agreement’, ‘mortgage credit agreement’ or ‘mortgage credit’, it 
																																																						
144 See Article 3(2) of the MCD. 
145 Article 3(2)(c) of the MCD. 
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non-accessory in nature like the German Grundschuld or the Swiss Schuldbrief (land charge), i.e. their 
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all member states. However, the member states failed to achieve any consensus on unifying or 
harmonising the security rights on immovables, so that the question of introducing the Euromortgage 
or Eurohypothec as a model for the integration of mortgage credit markets remains open (T Josipovic 




always refers to ‘an agreement whereby a creditor grants or promises to grant, to a 
consumer, a credit falling within the scope of Article 3’.149 As can be seen in Articles 
1 and 3, the MCD applies only to consumer credit agreements that relate to residential 
immovable property. Other consumer credit agreements that relate to immovable 
property without any residential purpose are outside the scope of the MCD.150 If the 
credit agreement falls under the ambit of the MCD as described above, the MCD 




The overall assessment of the history and objectives, the scope of application of the 
NCA and MCD and the term ‘mortgage agreement’ under NCA and MCD leads to the 
following findings: 
(1) Both the NCA and the MCD are comprehensive pieces of legislation. They 
are – broadly speaking – aimed at balancing several financial sector policy objectives: 
consumer protection, financial inclusion, and stability and integrity of the financial 
markets. While consumer protection might be the bedrock principle of both statutes, it 
is neither under the NCA nor the MCD the sole or predominant legislative purpose. 
The main objectives of NCA and MCD appear to be substantially similar.152 
However, the NCA has a stronger emphasis on socially transformative objectives with 
section 3 explicitly pointed towards the promotion and advancement of economic and 
social welfare, inter alia by making the credit markets accessible for all South 
Africans, ‘in particular to those who have historically been unable to access credit 
under sustainable market conditions’ (section 3(a) NCA). Moreover, it can be inferred 
from the legislative procedure that the legislator was looking at the protection of 
individuals against over-indebtedness and reckless lending rather than focusing on the 
underlying systemic risks that can be caused by such scenarios. The MCD, on the other 
hand, seems to have a stronger focus on the stability of the credit market as a whole. 
Consumer protection and the promotion of responsible lending and borrowing are 
strongly considered in the light of the financial crisis (see for example recital 3 of the 
Directive) and consequently considered a systemic risk to the financial market. 
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The different weightings of the statutory objectives derive to a great extent from 
the historical contexts under which NCA and MCD were drafted. Although the 
drafting process of the MCD originated in 1985153, the final steps in the legislative 
process took place in the years after the financial crisis. The Directive was therefore 
greatly influenced by the lessons that were drawn from the crisis. The NCA, on the 
other hand, came into full effective operation on 1 June 2007. The drafting process 
thus took place before the financial crisis had its devastating effect on the world 
economy. When drafting the legal provisions, the legislator was consequently looking 
on the developments of the domestic consumer credit market and how to overcome its 
shortcomings instead of focussing on an international regulatory perspective. 
(2) Both NCA and MCD aim at guaranteeing a high level of consumer 
protection. On the face of it, NCA and MCD thus seem to have a similar personal 
scope applying to ‘consumers’. However, NCA and MCD apply a different notion of 
‘consumer’ insofar as, in general, both natural and small juristic persons enjoy the 
protection of the NCA, whilst the MCD applies to natural persons only. 
Despite the different notion of ‘consumer’, the personal scope of application as 
regards pre-contractual assessments in (mortgage) credit agreements in terms of 
Chapter 4 Part D of the NCA154 and Articles 18 and 20(1) of the MCD appears to be 
substantially the same as the NCA excludes any juristic person from the scope of 
Chapter 4 Part D.155 In this regard, both NCA and MCD apply to natural persons only. 
However, the scope of application still remains distinct. Chapter 4 Part D of the NCA 
applies irrespective of whether the natural person seeks a credit for a private or 
commercial purpose156, while the MCD only applies to consumers acting for purposes 
which are outside his trade, business or profession. 
(3) The credit agreements that fall within the scope of the MCD are not 
congruent to the definition of ‘mortgage agreement’ under the NCA. Unlike the 
definition of ‘mortgage agreement’ under the NCA, Article 3 of the MCD embraces 
agreements regardless of whether they are secured by a real security right on 
																																																						
153 See chapter 2 para 2.1 above. 
154 In the context of the NCA, the pre-contractual assessment is considered a part of the concept of 
‘reckless credit’ (See chapter 3 below). 
155 Section 78(1) read with section 6(a) of the NCA. 
156 This can be inferred from two circumstances: First, the NCA does not limit the scope of application 
of Chapter 4 Part D to instances, where the natural person seeks the credit for purposes that are outside 
his trade, business or profession. Secondly, section 81(2)(b) expressly mentions ‘commercial purposes’ 





immovable property (so-called ‘home-loans’).157 The definition of mortgage 
agreement under the NCA is narrower in this regard as it only applies to ‘a credit 
agreement that is secured by the registration of a mortgage bond’.158 This, however, 
does not mean that consumer credit agreements that are not secured by the registration 
of a mortgage bond are excluded from the scope of the NCA, since its scope is by no 
means confined to mortgage agreements.159 On the other hand, the NCA applies a 
broader definition in the sense that a ‘mortgage agreement’ – unlike under the 
provisions of the MCD – does not necessarily need to relate to residential immovable 
property. 
In this chapter, an overview was given of the NCA and the MCD, their 
similarities and dissimilarities. Chapter 3 will specifically look at the pre-contractual 
assessment in mortgage credit agreements that have been introduced to the legal 
frameworks of South Africa and the EU in order to prevent reckless lending.  
 
Chapter 3: Pre-contractual assessment in mortgage credit 
agreements under the National Credit Act and the  
Mortgage Credit Directive 
 
1. National Credit Act 
1.1 Introduction 
Chapter 4 Part D of the NCA160 deals with the concepts of ‘over-indebtedness’ and 
‘reckless credit’ that have been introduced into South African consumer credit law by 
virtue of the NCA.161 As has been pointed out already, this part of the NCA does not 
apply to credit agreements in respect of which the consumer is a juristic person.162 
																																																						
157 T Josipovic op cit note 112 at 238. 
158 Section 1(e) of the NCAA. 
159 See chapter 1 para 1.1 above. 
160 Sections 78 - 88. 
161 See chapter 2 para 1.1 above. 
162 Section 78(1) read with section 6(a) of the NCA. The provisions of the NCA relating to over-
indebtedness and reckless credit do, however, apply to stokvels – the stokvel is a peculiar feature of the 
South African credit market and defined in section 1 of the NCA as a formal or informal rotating 
financial scheme with entertainment, social or economic objectives (for a full discussion of stokvels see 
WG Schulze ‘The Origin and Legal Nature of the Stokvel’ (1997) 9 SA Merc LJ 18 and (1997) SA Merc 
LJ 153) – as stokvels are excluded from the definition of a juristic person pursuant to section 1 of the 
NCA, which is why stokvels enjoy the full protection of the NCA just as natural persons do when they 
borrow money from banks (M Kelly-Louw op cit note 5 at 292). However, the provisions pertaining to 
over-indebtedness and reckless credit as set out in Chapter 4 Part D of the NCA do not apply to a 
transaction between a stokvel and a member of that stokvel in accordance with the rules of that stokvel 




The pre-contractual assessment in credit agreements is indivisibly linked to the 
concepts of ‘reckless credit’ and ‘over-indebtedness’ as can be seen particularly in 
sections 80(1) and 81 of the NCA. 
The NCAA and the amended National Credit Regulations brought about 
significant changes in the affordability assessment procedure as part of the pre-
contractual assessment. On 13 March 2013, the DTI published the amended National 
Credit Regulations including Affordability Assessment Regulations (hereafter 
‘AARs’) in addition to the NCAA.163 
This part of chapter 3 will address the question how to determine if a credit 
agreement is ‘reckless’. In this regard, a special emphasis will be on the assessment 
mechanisms and procedures used by credit providers to prevent entering into reckless 
credit agreements. Moreover, this part of the study will look at the requirements of the 
AARs and examine the question of whether there are any specific requirements or 
standards relating to the pre-contractual assessment in mortgage credit agreements. 
Lastly, the consequences of reckless credit and the powers of the court with regard to 
reckless credit will be examined. 
 
1.2 Reckless credit  
To determine when a credit agreement is reckless, one must turn to section 80(1) 
of the NCA.164 Section 80(1) of the NCA envisages two types of reckless credit 
agreements.165 The section provides as follows: 
 
A credit agreement is reckless if, at the time that the agreement was made, 
or when the amount improved in terms of the agreement is increased other 
than an increase in terms of section 119(4) 
(a) the credit provider failed to conduct an assessment as required by 
section 81(2), irrespective of what the outcome of such an assessment 
might have concluded at the time; or 
(b) the credit provider, having conducted an assessment as required by 
section 81(2), entered into the credit agreement with the consumer 
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despite the fact that the preponderance of information available to the 
credit provider indicated that 
(i) the consumer did not generally understand or appreciate the 
consumer’s risks, costs or obligations under the proposed credit 
agreement166; or 
(ii) entering into that credit agreement would make the consumer over-
indebted167. 
 
It follows that a credit granting is reckless if the credit provider falls foul of the 
requirement to undertake a proper pre-contractual assessment in terms of section 81(2) 
of the NCA. 
Although the NCA gives some guidance on when a credit agreement is 
recklessly granted, it remains the task of the courts to decide this issue on a case-by-
case basis. In respect of the approach to be taken by a court when addressing this 
matter, the South Gauteng High Court in SA Taxi Securitisation (Pty) Ltd v Mbatha168 
held: 
 
While one of the purposes of the NCA is to discourage reckless credit, the 
Act is also designed to facilitate access to credit by borrowers who were 
previously denied such access. An over-critical armchair approach by the 
court towards credit providers when evaluating reckless credit, or the 
imposition of excessive penalties upon lenders who have recklessly allowed 
credit, would significantly chill the availability of credit especially to the 
less affluent members of our society.169 
 
																																																						
166 It has been submitted that that this type of reckless credit does not only refer to the requirement to 
‘assess’ the consumer’s general understanding or appreciation but, more accurately, implies that the 
credit provider has a duty to inform the consumer of his or her risks, costs or obligations (Ibid para 
11.4.3). 
167 A consumer is over-indebted according to section 79 of the NCA, ‘if the preponderance of available 
information at the time a determination is made indicates that the particular consumer is or will be 
unable to satisfy in a timely manner all the obligations under all the credit agreements to which the 
consumer is a party, having regard to that consumer’s 
(a) financial means, prospects and obligations; and 
(b) probable propensity to satisfy in a timely manner all the obligations under all the credit 
agreements to which the consumer is a party, as indicated by the consumer’s history of debt 
repayment.’ 
168 SA Taxi Securitisation (Pty) Ltd v Mbatha 2011 (1) SA 310 (GSJ). 




The court thus explicitly took into account the NCA’s objective of ‘promoting the 
development of a credit market that is accessible to all South Africans’170 when 
evaluating reckless credit. However, it remains unclear what the impact of this 
objective on the test of reckless credit really is on a practical level.  
In Absa Bank Limited v Kganakga171, the court stated that section 80 of the NCA 
refers to whether a credit agreement is reckless or not. ‘It deals with no other 
interactions whether they be offers to purchase, agreements of sale, lease agreements, 
subdivision agreements and resulting applications, partnership agreements, company 
memoranda or shareholders agreements, deeds of trusts.’172 Consequently, section 80 
of the NCA only looks at the credit agreement between the credit provider and the 
consumer and is not concerned with other commercial engagements between persons 
or entities. Put differently, the NCA is not about the risk in the value of that which is 
acquired with credit. It is concerned with the risk in the ability to pay back the credit 
itself.173 
 
1.3 Assessment mechanisms and procedures 
It is clear from the above that section 80(1) of the NCA dealing with reckless credit 
largely relates to the assessment as required by section 81 of the NCA. According to 
section 81(2), credit providers may not enter into a credit agreement with a prospective 
consumer (a natural person) without conducting a comprehensive pre-assessment of 
the consumer, including  
(a) his or her general understanding and appreciation of the risks and costs of 
the proposed credit, and of the rights and obligations in connection with the 
agreement;  
(b) the consumer’s debt re-payment history; and  
(c) an assessment of whether the consumer can afford the transaction by virtue 
of his or her existing financial means, prospects and obligations.174 
From the matters that the credit provider is required to address when conducting 
an assessment subject to section 81(2) of the NCA as listed above, it is clear that the 
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172 Ibid para 21. 
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assessment is more comprehensive than a mere affordability assessment.175 In general, 
the pre-contractual assessment shall ensure that both the consumer and the credit 
provider make informed and responsible decisions on whether they enter into a credit 
agreement or not. 
As regards the consumer’s obligation to cooperate during the pre-contractual 
assessment, section 81(1) requires the consumer to fully and truthfully answer any 
requests for information made by the credit provider as part of the required assessment 
when applying for a credit agreement, and while that application is being considered 
by the credit provider. A credit provider is entitled to accept the veracity of information 
provided to it by or on behalf of the customer, unless there are indications that would 
reasonably alert the credit provider to the contrary.176 It is a complete defence to an 
allegation that a credit agreement is reckless if the credit provider establishes that the 
consumer failed to fully and truthfully answer any requests in the course of an 
assessment subject to section 81(2) of the NCA.177 Therefore, the NCA does not only 
place obligations on the credit provider but also holds the consumer responsible for 
preventing reckless lending. 
Although section 81(2) of the NCA requires the credit provider to take 
reasonable steps to conduct a pre-contractual assessment, it does not specify what these 
reasonable steps are and how exactly the assessment must be done.178 Apart from 
obliging the credit provider to have regard to the broad considerations indicated in 
section 81(2) of the NCA and imposing a duty on the consumer to answer fully and 
truthfully during the assessment in terms of section 81(2), initially no standard format 
for the assessment was prescribed in the NCA.179 It was thus left to the courts to give 
some guidance as to whether or not a credit provider has taken the required steps to 
meet its assessment obligations in terms of section 81(2) of the NCA.  
In Horwood v FirstRand Bank Ltd180, the court held that, in light of the wording 
of sections 81(2) and 82(1), it had to be determined objectively on the facts and 
circumstances of the given case if the credit provider has taken the reasonable steps to 
meet its assessment obligations.181 The case Absa Bank Limited v De Beer and 
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Others182 concerned the consolidation and extension of earlier loan agreements by a 
further loan which was secured by a mortgage bond and by third parties’ standing 
surety. The court held that the assessment in terms of section 81 of the NCA must be 
done reasonably, i.e. not irrationally. In this regard, it found that it is clearly irrational 
of the credit provider to have taken the surety’s income into account in reaching the 
conclusion that the ‘existing financial means’183 existed to pay the instalments, 
considering that a surety is secondary in nature in the sense that it remains totally out 
of the picture until the principal debtors have failed to comply with their obligations 
under the credit agreement.184 In Absa Bank Limited v Kganakga185, the court stated 
that the assessment as required by section 81 of the NCA must be situate in context, 
taking into account, e.g., the consumers background and experience in matters of credit 
and finance.186 In respect of the obligation to take reasonable steps, the court 
summarised as follows: 
 
In sum, the credit granter must take reasonable steps to assess that the 
proposed consumer understands and appreciates what she is getting herself 
into, what it means to have entered into certain obligations and what rights 
she has in relation to the credit granter, what the risks are of borrowing too 
much or failing to pay full or any instalments; the credit granter must do the 
arithmetic on income and expenses, other assets, prospective income and 
expenses; the credit granter must see whether or not the prospective 
consumer is a good or bad risk insofar as previous borrowings and 
repayments are concerned.187 
 
In light of the consequences of a credit provider falling foul of the requirement to 
conduct an assessment in terms of section 81 of the NCA188, it does not come as a 
surprise that credit providers commonly try to protect themselves by making use of 
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standard form ‘compliance clauses’.189 In Absa Bank v COE Family Trust and 
Others190, the clause in a mortgage loan agreement reads as follows: 
 
The borrower states that 
11.1 he undertakes his risks and costs, as well as his rights and obligations 
under this agreement; 
11.2 entering into this agreement will not cause him to become over-
indebted as contemplated in the National Credit Act; 
11.3 he has fully and truthfully answered all and any requests for 
information made of him by or on behalf of the bank leading up to the 
conclusion of this agreement; 
11.4 the bank has given the borrower a pre-agreement statement and 
quotation.191 
 
The defendants raised the defence of reckless credit inter alia because they did not 
understand the inherent risks of the contract. The plaintiff, on the other hand, argued 
that that the defendants cannot raise this defence, because they had entered into a 
contract which had specifically made provision for these issues. The plaintiff’s 
submission was that section 81(2) of the NCA was not of application when clauses 
11.1 - 11.4 of the agreement so concluded, confirmed the veracity of the answers given 
by defendants.192 The court, however, dismissed the application for summary 
judgment inter alia because it appeared that no assessment as required by section 81(2) 
of the NCA was conducted. The court thus found that section 81(2) of the NCA 
governs the dispute, notwithstanding the terms of the contract.193 It can therefore be 
concluded that a standard form ‘compliance clause’ in itself is not sufficient to show 
that the credit provider has met its obligations to conduct a proper assessment in terms 
of section 81 of the NCA.  
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Originally, section 82(1) of the NCA merely stated that it is in the discretion of 
the respective credit provider to determine for itself the evaluative mechanisms or 
models and procedures to be used in meeting its assessment obligation under section 
81(2) of the NCA, provided that any such mechanism, model or procedure results in a 
fair and objective assessment.194 Prior to the enactment of the AARs, section 82(2)(a) 
read with section 82(3) of the NCA provided that the National Credit Regulator may 
have published non-binding guidelines proposing evaluative mechanisms, models and 
procedures to be used to determine whether credit is being granted recklessly in 
relation to credit agreements generally (other than for developmental credit 
agreements). It was further provided that if a credit provider repeatedly failed to meet 
its obligations under section 81(2) of the NCA or customarily used evaluative 
mechanisms, models or procedures that do not result in a fair and objective assessment, 
the National Credit Regulator could have applied to the Tribunal195 for an order in 
terms of section 82(4) of the NCA to require that the credit provider applies any 
guidelines published by the National Credit Regulator in terms of Section 82(2)(b) or 
any alternative guidelines consistent with prevalent industry practice, as determined 
by the Tribunal. 
However, until the first quarter of 2013 no guidelines for the assessment in terms 
of section 81 of the NCA were published by the National Credit Regulator with the 
effect that no matters relating to non-compliant assessment models were brought 
before the Tribunal and very few cases were reported relating to reckless credit 
granting.196 As a result, the control mechanisms set out in the NCA relating to the 
evaluative mechanisms or models and procedures being used by credit providers were 
effectively meaningless. Credit providers were obligated to conduct pre-contractual 
assessments in terms of section 81(2) of the NCA without any guidance. Hence, they 
had a very wide discretion how to structure and conduct the pre-contractual assessment 
in terms of section 81(2) of the NCA.197  
																																																						
194 Section 82(1) had to be read with section 61(5) of the NCA, which provides that a credit provider 
may determine for itself any scoring or other evaluative mechanism or model to be used in managing, 
underwriting and pricing credit risk, provided that any such mechanism or model is not founded or 
structured upon a statistical or other analysis in which the basis of risk categorisation, differentiation or 
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In May 2013, the National Credit Regulator issued a public notice in which 
certain draft affordability guidelines were proposed. These were followed by the much 
more comprehensive ‘Affordability Assessment Guidelines’, published by the 
National Credit Regulator in September 2013.198 It was laid down that the 
Affordability Assessment Guidelines should be read with the ‘Credit Provider’s Code 
of Conduct to Combat Over-Indebtedness’, also dated September 2013.199 The process 
of giving statutory guidance by way of standardising and unifying the assessment in 
terms of section 81 of the NCA – specifically the regulation of the affordability 
assessment as required by section 81(2)(a)(iii) – that commenced with a joint media 
statement issued by the Minister of Finance and the Chairperson of the Banking 
Association of South Africa (BASA) in November 2012 entitled ‘Ensuring 
Responsible Market Conduct for Bank Lending’200 eventually resulted in the NCAA 
introducing significant amendments to the assessment mechanisms and procedures set 
out in section 82 of the NCA. Section 48 of the NCA was amended so that it provided 
for the Minister to prescribe criteria and measures to determine the outcome of 
affordability assessments.201 Section 24(a) of the NCAA set out that the Minister of 
the DTI must, on recommendation of the National Credit Regulator, make affordability 
assessment regulations. These are binding in nature to the effect that evaluative 
mechanisms or models and procedures to be used by a credit provider in meeting its 
assessment obligations under section 81 must be in line with the affordability 
assessment regulation according to the amended section 82(2)(a) and (3) of the 
NCA.202 
 
1.4 Affordability Assessment Regulations 
The AARs were published on 13 March 2015 as part of the amended National Credit 
Regulations.203 Chapter 3 of the National Credit Regulations in force until that date 
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was amended by the insertion of Regulation 23A headed ‘Criteria to Conduct 
Affordability Assessment’. These provisions are referred to as the AARs. 
The AARs provide a benchmark against which a credit provider’s compliance 
with its pre-contractual assessment obligations in terms of section 81 of the NCA is 
measured.204 It is important to note that the AARs lay down minimum standard 
requirements that the credit provider has to comply with in order to pass its obligation 
to refrain from reckless credit granting.205 Moreover, it has been submitted that the 
assessment required in terms of section 81(2) of the NCA goes beyond a mere 
affordability assessment. As the name indicates, the AARs only relate to affordability 
assessments which is why their scope does not cover the whole range of assessment 
measures as required by section 81(2) of the NCA. It is therefore not sufficient for a 
credit provider to merely rely on and comply with the AARs in order to pass the 
assessment requirements in terms of section 81 of the NCA. 
In order to achieve a parallelism in the scope of application with Chapter 4 Part 
D of the NCA, the AARs apply to natural persons only and exclude juristic persons 
from their ambit.206 In regard of existing ‘financial means and prospects’, the AARs 
stipulate that ‘[a] credit provider must take practicable steps to assess the consumer or 
joint consumer’s discretionary income to determine whether the consumer has the 
financial means and prospects to pay the proposed credit instalments.’207 Regulation 
23A(4) further elaborates on this requirement. It provides that a credit provider is 
required to validate the consumer’s gross income. Depending on the respective type 
of occupation (employed, self-employed, informally employed or employed in a way 
through which the consumer does not receive a payslip or proof of income), the 
consumer has to hand in the latest three payslips or latest bank statements showing the 
latest three salary deposits, the latest three documented proofs of incomes, or the latest 
financial statements. 
In line with the consumer’s requirement in terms of section 81(1) of the NCA to 
fully and truthfully answer any requests for information made by the credit provider, 
the consumer must provide authentic documentation and accurately disclose all 
financial obligations to enable the credit provider to conduct the affordability 
assessment.208 
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According to Regulation 23A(8), ‘[a] credit provider must make a calculation of 
the consumer’s existing financial means, prospects and obligations as envisaged in 
sections 78(3) and 81(2)(a)(iii)’ of the NCA. The methodology to be used in this regard 
must comply with sections 23A(9) and (10) of the Regulations. Table 1 to the 
Regulations sets out the minimum expense norms that the credit provider, in general, 
must utilise instead of verifying the consumer’s living expenses.209 However, the credit 
provider may, in exceptional cases, accept the consumer’s declared necessary 
expenses which are lower than those set out in Table 1 to the Regulations provided the 
questionnaire set out in Annexure A to the Regulations (‘Declaration of Consumer’s 
Necessary Expense Questionnaire’) is completed by the consumer or joint 
consumers.210 
The AARs introduce a new right for the consumer regarding the outcome of an 
affordability assessment211: a consumer who is aggrieved by the outcome of the 
affordability assessment may at any time lodge a complaint in terms of section 134 or 
136 of the NCA with the credit provider for dispute resolution.212 The credit provider 
must then attempt to resolve the complaint within 14 days.213 If the grievance is not or 
not in a timely manner addressed by the credit provider, the consumer can, according 
to Regulation 23A(18), approach the National Credit Regulator. 
 
1.5 Pre-contractual assessment in mortgage credit agreements 
The NCA does not provide for specific rules regarding the issues of pre-contractual 
assessment, reckless credit and over-indebtedness in mortgage credit agreements. 
Moreover, Chapter 4 Part D of the NCA does not differentiate between small, 
intermediate and large credit agreements.214 The provisions regarding reckless credit 
and over-indebtedness thus apply irrespective of whether the credit agreement entered 
into is a mortgage credit agreement or another form of credit agreement falling under 
the ambit of the NCA. Section 80(3) of the NCA sets out some of the factors that must 
be considered in determining whether there has been reckless credit. These include a 
determination of the value of any credit facility available to the borrower at the time 
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that the credit was granted and the amount of any pre-existing credit guarantees.215 
However, section 80(3) of the NCA does not distinguish between different kinds of 
agreements. Consequently, no specific provision is made for mortgage credit 
agreements.  
Likewise, the AARs do not provide for any distinct provisions regarding 
mortgage credit. The affordability assessment pursuant to the AARs takes place 
irrespective of the type of credit agreement that the consumer wishes to obtain.  
Whether or not the credit in question is a mortgage credit agreement may, 
however, be relevant insofar as inherent risks are at issue that relate to the specific type 
of credit agreement. The customer must understand and appreciate the risks that 
specifically relate to mortgage credit agreements as part of the assessment in terms of 
section 81(2)(a)(i) of the NCA. If the credit agreement in question is secured by a 
mortgage bond, the immovable property may be at risk if the instalments are not paid. 
The credit provider must therefore see that the prospective customer understands what 
is meant by and how and when the mortgage is used in relation to the credit 
agreement.216 In this regard, the customer’s prior experience and knowledge of 
obtaining credit secured by a mortgage bond over property must be taken into 
account.217 
 
1.6 Consequences of reckless credit and powers of the court with regard to 
reckless credit 
Section 83(1) of the NCA sets out that despite any provision of law to the contrary, in 
any court or the Tribunal proceedings in which a credit agreement is being considered, 
the court or the Tribunal, as the case may be, may declare that the credit agreement is 
reckless.218 If a court or the Tribunal declares a credit agreement reckless in terms of 
section 80(1)(a) because no pre-contractual assessment was done or in terms of section 
80(1)(b)(i) because, although an assessment was done, the consumer did not generally 
understand or appreciate the risks, costs or obligations under the proposed credit 
agreement, the court may  
																																																						
215 SA Taxi Securitisation (Pty) Ltd v Mbatha supra note 168 para 40. 
216 Absa Bank Limited v Kganakga supra note 164 para 25. 
217 Ibid para 38. 
218 Section 83 of the NCA was amended by section 25 of the NCAA insofar as the National Consumer 
Tribunal, established in terms of section 26 of the NCA, now also has the power to declare that reckless 




(a) set aside all or part of the consumer’s rights and obligations flowing from 
such an agreement, as the court determines just and reasonable in the 
circumstances of the given case or  
(b) suspend its force and effect.219 
If the consumer, to the satisfaction of the court, invokes that he or she would 
have never become involved in the credit transaction if it wasn’t for the recklessness 
of the credit provider, it might be ‘just and reasonable’ to set aside the credit 
agreement.220 In this case, the agreement would be null and void and treated as if it 
had never existed.221 If, on the other hand, the credit agreement is merely suspended, 
section 84 of the NCA sets out the effect of the suspension. During the period for 
which the force and effect of a credit agreement is suspended in terms of the NCA,  
(a) the consumer is not obliged to make any payment required under that 
agreement;222  
(b) no interest, fee or other charge under that agreement may be charged to the 
consumer;223 and 
(c) the credit provider’s rights under the agreement, or under any law in respect 
of that agreement, are unenforceable, despite any law to the contrary.224 
Importantly, both in the case of setting aside or suspension of a reckless credit 
agreement, the consumer is not entitled to further retain possession and utilise the 
credit provider’s security.225 In SA Taxi Securitisation (Pty) Ltd v Mbatha, a case in 
which the credit provider’s security at issue was a motor vehicle, the court put it this 
way: 
 
It seems unlikely that the legislature ever intended that the consumer could 
keep the ‘money and the box’. If the consumer obtained possession and use 
of a motor vehicle in circumstances in which no credit should have been 
extended to the consumer, it would be fundamentally unfair and 
counterproductive for the consumer to continue to use the vehicle while at 
the same time not making any payments under the agreement.226 
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A court is empowered to invoke the provisions regarding reckless credit even 
without an allegation of reckless credit. Accordingly, a court can suo motu raise and 
investigate the issue of reckless credit.227 Of course a consumer may also raise the 
issue of reckless credit in defence of a claim228 or in a direct application to a court to 
have his or her credit declared recklessly granted.229 If, however, an allegation of 
reckless credit is made, the consumer who alleges that reckless credit has been 
extended bears the onus of proving it.230 Detailed information must be provided by the 
consumer in respect of the credit agreement in question; a bald allegation that there 
was ‘reckless credit’ or there is ‘over-indebtedness’ will not suffice.231 
 
2. Mortgage Credit Directive 
2.1 Introduction 
According to the MCD, consumer protection in the pre-contractual phase is based on 
various measures, including the provision of clear and general information on the 
credit granting process (Article 6 of the MCD) – most notably, by means of the 
European Standardised Information Sheet (‘ESIS’) as set out in Article 14 of the MCD  
– and the standardisation of the method of calculating the annual percentage of charge 
(APRC).232 The common aim of these measures is to provide the consumer with the 
information needed to compare the credits available on the market, assess their 
implications and make an informed decision on whether to conclude a mortgage credit 
agreement or not.233 Moreover, the pre-contractual measures aim at preventing 
consumers from assuming unaffordable credit obligations which at the end of the day 
may lead to residential immovable property foreclosures.234 The MCD stresses the 
importance of these pre-contractual measures given the significance of the financial 
commitments of the consumer for credit agreements relating to residential immovable 
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property235 and taking into account that taking out a mortgage is still a once-in-a-
lifetime decision in many markets.236 
Furthermore, when the promotion of a responsible lending regime is at issue, a 
central place in the pre-contractual phase is given to the assessment of the 
creditworthiness of the consumer as set out in Articles 18 - 20 of the MCD. The 
assessment of creditworthiness shall not only prevent the consumer from becoming 
over-indebted but is also designed to enhance the credit provider’s ability to make an 
informed decision. The assessment of creditworthiness shall enable the credit provider 
to establish, in the pre-contractual phase, the consumer’s real capacity to regularly 
meet his or her commitments under the mortgage credit agreement, i.e., to be able to 
pay the credit instalments.237 
Despite the fact that, strictly speaking, the provisions governing the ESIS are not 
part of the pre-contractual assessment of the consumer, they play a central role in the 
promotion of a responsible credit regime and will therefore be examined in greater 
detail in this part of the study. Subsequently, the pre-contractual assessment of 
creditworthiness in terms of the MCD will be scrutinised. 
 
2.1 European Standardised Information Sheet (‘ESIS’) 
The ESIS is not an invention of the MCD. It has its origin in the 2001 European 
Agreement on a Voluntary Code of Conduct on Pre-contractual Information for Home 
Loans (hereafter ‘Code’ or ‘Code of Conduct’)238 which was negotiated and adopted 
by European associations of consumers and the European Credit Sector Associations 
offering home loans.239 The Code of Conduct entitled consumers to receive a 
personalised European Standard Information Sheet which was intended to facilitate 
consumers’ access to comprehensive and understandable information on the mortgage 
product at issue, and thereby facilitate comparability of the credits available on the 
market.240 The voluntary nature of the Code of Conduct, however, resulted in 
considerable disparities regarding adherence to the Code. Data provided by the 
European Commission and the European Banking Industry Committee’s (EBIC) in a 
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progress report on the implementation of the code published in April 2009241 showed 
that adherence to the Code was unsatisfactory for several countries. While Germany, 
Malta, and the UK showed a compliance rate of 100 per cent, the level of adhesion 
and implementation in France and Cyprus was below 60 per cent.242 Accordingly, the 
European Commission identified inter alia a lack of EU wide comparability due to an 
insufficient adherence to the Code of Conduct, divergences in the timing and 
application of providing pre-contractual information in the form of the European 
Standardised Information Sheet, and a lack of credible monitoring and enforcement 
mechanisms in the White Paper on the Integration of EU Mortgage Credit Markets.243 
The assessment of the problems in regard of the provision of pre-contractual 
information on mortgage credit in the EU eventually resulted in the provision of the 
ESIS as set out in the MCD. 
The ESIS is a standardised pre-contractual disclosure document. A model is 
provided in Annex II Part A of the MCD. This model must be followed by the Member 
States.244 Comprehensive instructions are given in Annex II Part B on how the ESIS 
must be completed. The ESIS contains inter alia information on the main features of 
the loan, interest rate and other costs, frequency and number of payments, the amount 
of each instalment and early repayment. Unlike most of the provisions in the MCD 
that merely aim at minimum harmonisation, Member States are bound to transpose the 
rules on the ESIS (Article 14(2), Annex II of the MCD) into their national legislation 
without any variations (maximum harmonisation as stipulated in Article 2(2) of the 
MCD).245 The obligation of maximum harmonisation, however, refers only to the rules 
on the use of a standard form.246 Other rules on personalised pre-contractual 
information are subject to either minimum or optional harmonisation.247 
The ESIS must be handed out to the consumer ‘in good time before the 
consumer is bound by any credit agreement or offer.’248 If explanations have been 
given to consumers before the credit provider has assessed their financial situation and 
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creditworthiness249 – whether in the form of the ESIS or in any other form – these 
explanations will need to be adapted before the credit agreement is concluded, albeit 
no separate document needs to be drawn up.250 
 
2.2 Obligation to assess the creditworthiness of the consumer 
2.2.1 Historical development 
Comparable to the development of the ESIS, the development of the creditworthiness 
assessment was not revolutionary, but evolutionary. The assessment pertaining to the 
creditworthiness of the consumer is not a newly created feature of the MCD. Prior to 
the enactment of the MCD and its transposition into the domestic law of the Member 
States, credit providers have already undertaken assessments on the financial 
background of potential borrowers either as an obligation under general national 
banking laws in the respective Member State or as an integral part of their business 
conduct.251 Specific legal requirements encouraging mortgage credit providers to 
conduct a creditworthiness assessment prior to granting a credit (or industry 
guidelines/recommendations) have been in place in most of the Member States. Only 
in eight Member States252, no such legal requirements, guidelines or recommendations 
were provided.253 Moreover, some countries opted to apply Article 8 of the CCD 
headed ‘Obligation to assess the creditworthiness of the consumer’ to mortgage credit 
agreements despite the fact that the CCD excluded mortgage credit agreements from 
its scope.254 It was the MCD that introduced a common legal framework regarding the 
obligation to assess the creditworthiness of the consumer in mortgage credit 
agreements across the EU. 
While originally the assessment of creditworthiness was seen as serving public 
interest only, it is now also perceived as a means of individual consumer protection 
which aims at preventing the consumer from concluding commitments he or she 
cannot fulfil and thus protecting consumers against the risk of over-indebtedness and 
bankruptcy.255 This shift in paradigm is attributed to the decision of the European 
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Court of Justice (‘ECJ’) in LCL Le Crédit Lyonnais v Fesih Kalhan.256 The judgment 
was induced by the French ‘tribunal d’instance d’Orléans’ requesting a preliminary 
ruling of the ECJ under Article 267 TFEU. The request concerned the interpretation 
of Article 8 and 23 of the CCD that set out the creditworthiness assessment and the 
sanctions in case of a defective or non-existing creditworthiness assessment in the 
context of the CCD. The court held that the assessment of creditworthiness is not only 
a prudential requirement but a pre-contractual obligation of the credit provider, 
intended to protect consumers against over-indebtedness.257  
The changed perception of the creditworthiness assessment is more than a 
dogmatic classification. It had practical implications insofar as it caused legislators, 
for instance the German legislator, to transform the obligation to assess the 
creditworthiness from a matter of purely prudential, i.e. public law, to also a matter of 
private law.258 Despite the fact that recital 83 of the MCD leaves it to the discretion of 
the Member States to transpose the creditworthiness assessment in national law by 
prudential or civil law, the German legislator felt obliged to lay it down as a matter of 
private law according to the explanatory memorandum to the German Act on the 
implementation of the MCD.259 Following inter alia the decision of the ECJ in the case 
Le Crédit Lyonnais260, the German legislator considered it insufficient to lay down 
only a prudential sanction in case of a defective creditworthiness assessment.261 As a 
result, a customer may now assert individual rights262 if the credit provider commits a 
breach of its duty to conduct a proper assessment of creditworthiness. The 
creditworthiness assessment does no longer only provide obligations of the credit 
provider vis-à-vis the national regulatory authority.263 
 
2.2.2 Content of the obligation to assess the creditworthiness of the consumer 
Article 18 of the MCD requires that, before concluding a credit agreement, the creditor 
makes a thorough assessment of the consumer's creditworthiness and takes into 
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appropriate account factors relevant to assess (and verify)264 the ability of the 
consumer to meet his or her obligations under the credit agreement. The brief wording 
of Article 18 of the MCD is supplemented by recital 55 of the MCD that gives some 
guidance on the factors to be taken into account in the assessment procedure. Recital 
55 stipulates that the assessment of creditworthiness should take into consideration all 
necessary and relevant factors that could influence a consumer’s ability to repay the 
credit over its lifetime, for instance a consumer’s income, savings and assets. On the 
other side of the coin, regular expenditure, debts and other financial commitments of 
the consumer must be taken into account. Moreover, the assessment should include 
consideration of future payments or payment increases and reasonable allowance 
should be made for future events during the term of the proposed credit agreement 
such as a reduction in income where the credit term lasts into retirement.265 Thus it 
appears that the guidelines given in Article 18 and recital 55 of the MCD are very 
broad in terms of the income and more specific in terms of the expenditures to be taken 
into account in the course of the creditworthiness assessment. The MCD largely 
focusses on potential risks regarding the financial position of the consumer.266 
A consistent implementation and application of the creditworthiness assessment 
across the EU shall be ensured by the ‘Guidelines on creditworthiness assessment’267 
issued by the European Banking Authority (hereafter ‘EBA’).268 
The assessment of creditworthiness may include the use of loan-to-value, loan-
to-income, debt-to-income or similar ratios to assess the ability of a consumer to pay 
back the credit amount or set out minimum levels below which no credit would be 
deemed acceptable.269 However, the MCD itself does not provide for such ratios or 
minimum levels. It is left to the discretion of the Member States to issue additional 
guidance in this regard or to implement the Financial Stability Board’s Principles for 
Sound Residential Mortgage Underwriting Practices.270  
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The assessment of creditworthiness shall not rely predominantly on the value of 
the residential immovable property exceeding the amount of the credit or the 
assumption that the residential immovable property will increase in value (Article 18 
(3) of the MCD). The possibility of value increases of the property is therefore not the 
determinative element in the decision of granting a mortgage credit. The main focus is 
on the ability of the consumer to repay the credit.271 Consequently, market conduct 
known as ‘pure asset lending’, which can be defined as lending money without regard 
to the ability of the borrower to repay by instalments under the contract, in the 
knowledge that adequate security is available in the event of default, will be curbed.272 
Compared to the provisions of the CCD, the MCD requires a higher degree of 
due diligence in the assessment of creditworthiness. While the CCD merely requires 
conducting an assessment of creditworthiness, the MCD calls for a ‘thorough’ 
assessment and therefore applies a stricter standard in respect of the assessment of 
creditworthiness. In light of the MCD’s objectives, the European legislator 
consequently assumes that the credit agreements covered by the MCD pose a greater 
risk to the financial stability of the market and the financial soundness of the individual 
consumer due to the comparatively higher amounts of credit amounts and concomitant 
long-term commitments under the credit agreement. 
In order to conduct an effective creditworthiness assessment, the credit provider 
must gather all information relevant to the assessment.273 The credit provider may 
obtain information from internal and external sources, including the information 
provided to the credit provider by the consumer, an intermediary, or appointed 
representative.274 They may also be obtained from public and private databases used 
in all Member States for the assessment of creditworthiness, and each Member State 
shall ensure that access for all creditors from all Member States is guaranteed.275 The 
information so gathered must not only be assessed but also appropriately verified, 
including through reference to independently verifiable documentation when 
necessary.276 
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The assessment results determine the credit provider’s decision with regard to 
the credit application.277 Clearly, the creditor’s decision as to whether to grant the 
credit should be consistent with the outcome of the assessment of creditworthiness 
(recital 57 of the MCD).278 While a positive creditworthiness assessment should not 
constitute an obligation for the creditor to provide credit, Member States shall ensure 
that the credit provider only makes the credit available where the result of the 
assessment indicates that the obligations of the consumer under the mortgage credit 
agreement are likely to be met.279 In other words, the credit application must be 
rejected in case of a negative outcome of the creditworthiness assessment.280  
Unlike the NCA (read with the AARs), the MCD does not provide for any 
specific complaint mechanism regarding the outcome of an affordability assessment. 
 
2.3 Sanctions applicable to infringements of the obligation to assess the 
creditworthiness of the consumer 
The question arises as to the sanctions and consequences if the credit provider falls 
foul of its obligation to assess the creditworthiness of the consumer. According to 
Article 39 of the MCD, Member States should lay down rules on sanctions applicable 
to infringements of the MCD as transposed into national law. The MCD merely states 
that the sanctions provided for should be effective, proportionate and dissuasive.281 In 
Le Crédit Lyonnais282, the ECJ reiterated its approach according to which ‘the severity 
of penalties must be commensurate with the seriousness of the infringements for which 
they are imposed, in particular by ensuring a genuinely dissuasive effect, while 
respecting the general principle of proportionality.’283 However, within the wide limits 
of ‘effectiveness, proportionality and dissuasiveness’, the choice of sanctions remains 
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within the discretion of the Member States.284 It follows that the sanctions of a failure 
to conduct a proper creditworthiness assessment vary amongst the Member States. It 
is beyond the scope of this study to examine all of the different regimes of sanctions 
as set out in the national law of the Member States. However, the study will outline 
the regime of sanctions in some of the Member States, namely Germany, Greece, 
France, Austria and Ireland, for illustrative purposes without going into detail. 
All of these jurisdictions have in common that the sole breach of the obligation 
to assess the creditworthiness of the consumer does not turn the agreement into a 
‘reckless’ or ‘unfair’ credit relationship.285 The mortgage credit agreement remains 
valid and, unlike in the regime of sanctions provided for under the NCA286, is not set 
aside or suspended.287 
According to the German Civil Code (Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch – hereafter 
‘BGB’), the sanctions for a faulty or non-existent creditworthiness assessment will be 
as follows: First of all, the interest rate payable under the credit agreement will be 
reduced.288 A fixed interest rate will be replaced by the customary interest rate for 
German mortgage-backed bonds.289 A flexible interest rate will be replaced by the 
customary interbank rate.290 If, however, this interest rate is higher than the interest 
rate agreed upon, it will not be replaced.291 The reduction is retroactive so that the 
consumer may claim any overpaid interest.292 Secondly, the consumer has a right to 
terminate the credit agreement without any prepayment penalty becoming due.293 
Thirdly, the credit provider is barred from claiming damages under certain 
circumstances if the consumer is not able to fulfil his or her contractual obligations.294 
Lastly, the credit provider may not terminate or alter the credit agreement solely based 
on the fact that the creditworthiness assessment was conducted in an insufficient 
way.295 
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In Greece, non-compliance with the rules regarding the assessment of 
creditworthiness results in the consumer being discharged from the total cost of the 
credit, including the rates.296 The consumer will only be obliged to make restitution of 
the capital received according to the modalities under the credit agreement.297 
Unlike in Germany and Greece, the creditworthiness assessment remains a 
matter of purely prudential law in France and Austria.298 Also in Ireland, it seems like 
the creditworthiness assessment is still a matter of prudential law only. The MCD is 
transposed into the national law of Ireland by the EU (Consumer Mortgage Credit 
Agreements) Regulations 2016.299 Where a credit provider contravenes a provision 
under Regulation 19 dealing with the obligation to assess the creditworthiness of the 
consumer, that lender commits an offence.300 The Central Bank can issue sanctions in 
respect of this offence.301 However, it is unclear if the individual consumer can derive 
any claims from a misconduct of the credit provider regarding the creditworthiness 
assessment.302 
This short overview already shows that the legal framework as regards the 
sanctions for a defective creditworthiness assessment is still very fragmented across 
the Member States of the EU. 
 
3. Conclusion 
The aim of this chapter was to examine and compare the measures in South Africa and 
the EU regarding the pre-contractual assessment in mortgage credit agreements. The 
findings can be summarised as follows: 
(1) In recent years, pre-contractual affordability or creditworthiness assessments 
have made their way up the priority ladder for legislators, especially in the wake of the 
global financial crisis. International institutions such as the World Bank promote pre-
contractual (affordability) assessments as a key regulatory tool in the prevention of 
reckless or predatory lending.303 In line with these recommendations, the legislators in 
South Africa and the EU developed rules on pre-contractual assessments in consumer 
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credit agreements including mortgage credit agreements. In South Africa, pre-
contractual assessments were introduced as part of the concept of ‘reckless lending’ 
with the NCA coming into full force in 2007. The AARs, published in 2015, 
specifically elaborated on the affordability assessment requirements as part of the pre-
contractual assessment in terms of section 81 of the NCA. Clearly, the AARs aim at 
standardising and formalising the affordability assessment procedures in South Africa. 
In the EU, the rules on pre-contractual assessment have undergone an evolution from 
voluntary codes of conduct304 and national laws or voluntary business conducts305 to 
the binding rules of the MCD that had to be transposed into the national laws of the 
Member States across the EU. The MCD aims inter alia at setting standards for the 
pre-contractual assessment in mortgage loans and strives towards harmonisation 
across the EU. 
It follows that the legislative measures in both South Africa and the EU show a 
clear trend towards standardisation, unification and formalisation of the rules on pre-
contractual assessments. In both South Africa and the EU, the rules in regard of pre-
contractual assessments have moved away from non-binding guidelines towards a 
comprehensive set of binding regulations, particularly as regards the regulations on 
affordability assessments. The legislative approach has thus clearly become more 
interventionist.306  
(2) Despite the trend to standardise and formalise, and to provide guidelines as 
to how a credit provider shall assess the creditworthiness of the consumer, the legal 
frameworks still contain a number of indeterminate legal terms such as ‘thorough’ 
assessment, taking ‘appropriate account’ (Article 18 of the MCD), and taking 
‘reasonable steps’ (section 81(2) of the NCA). Especially in case of the ‘thorough’ 
assessment as required by Article 18 of the MCD, it remains to be seen how this term 
will be received and applied in the case law of the national courts of the Member States 
and the ECJ and what its impact on the practice of handing out mortgage credits will 
be.307  
(3) On the face of it, the NCA and MCD apply similar standards by looking at 
and verifying the consumer’s income, expenses and credit history in order to assess 
whether the consumer will be able to repay the mortgage credit. Moreover, both 
																																																						
304 i.e. the Code of Conduct on Pre-contractual Information for Home Loans (op cit note 240). 
305 See chapter 3 para 2.2.1 above. 
306 C van Heerden & S Renke op cit note 44 at 89. 




jurisdictions prescribe the disclosure of pre-contractual information in a standardised 
manner to enable the consumer to make an informed decision. There are, however, 
some differences between the legal frameworks. First of all, the legal framework in 
the EU sets out differential rules on mortgage credit agreements. Compared to the 
assessment in consumer credit agreements falling under the ambit of the CCD, the 
creditworthiness assessment under the MCD lays down a stricter standard for the 
assessment (‘thorough’ assessment). The South African NCA, on the other hand, does 
not differentiate between mortgage credit and other consumer credit agreements as 
regards the pre-contractual assessment. The rules on pre-contractual assessments apply 
irrespective of whether the credit agreement in question is a mortgage credit agreement 
or another kind of credit agreement falling under the ambit of the NCA. Accordingly, 
the MCD contains specific provisions relating to mortgage credit agreement, such as 
Article 18(3) of the MCD according to which the pre-contractual assessment may not 
rely predominantly on the value of the residential immovable property exceeding the 
amount of the credit or the assumption that the residential immovable property will 
increase in value, while the NCA and/or the AARs do not entail any such provision. 
Secondly, and most importantly, the consequences and sanctions if the credit 
provider fails to do a proper creditworthiness assessment significantly differ. The NCA 
provides that a court may set aside or suspend the consumer’s rights and obligations 
under a credit agreement if the agreement is deemed reckless. Under the MCD, on the 
other hand, the choice of sanctions remains within the discretion of the Member States 
with the effect that the rules vary amongst the Member States. However, the 
jurisdictions of the Member States considered in this study308 have in common that, 
unlike under the NCA, the credit agreement may neither be set aside nor suspended 
but remains valid. The sanctions will either be purely prudential (as in case of France 
and Austria), or will be limited to a reduction of interest and costs (Germany and 
Greece) or a right of the consumer to terminate the mortgage credit agreement 
(Germany).  
(4) Overall, the jurisdictions in South Africa and the EU apply a similar 
procedure of pre-contractual assessments in consumer credit agreements, including 
mortgage credit agreements, despite the differences that have been identified in this 
study. Moreover, they serve very similar statutory purposes, namely the prevention of 
over-indebtedness and reckless lending. The mechanisms and procedures of pre-
																																																						




contractual assessments, however, have not been transplanted from the European 
jurisdiction to the South African jurisdiction or vice versa. They have rather developed 
independently in the context of global and domestic developments in the consumer 
credit market. It may be inferred that affordability or creditworthiness assessments 
have emerged as an international best practice in the aim of creating a responsible 
credit regime.  
 
Chapter 4: Pre-contractual assessments at the crossroads between 
responsible lending and financial exclusion 
 
1. Introduction 
Since the global financial crises at the latest, it is largely uncontested that the consumer 
credit market in general and the residential mortgage credit market in particular is not 
self-correcting but needs regulatory intervention.309 The regulatory intervention in 
terms of the South African NCA and the European MCD aims at creating a responsible 
(mortgage) credit regime. In her book ‘International responses to issues of credit and 
over-indebtedness in the wake of crisis’310, Therese Wilson commented on the 
legislative framework pertaining to responsible lending inter alia in South Africa and 
the EU. She argues that an effective responsible lending regime should include certain 
common criteria against which the efficiency of the lending regime may be 
benchmarked.311 In her view, a responsible lending regime should  
 
(1) focus on responsible lending, rather than responsible borrowing, in order 
to avoid over-indebtedness; (2) focus on consumer credit in general, not 
limited to residential mortgage loans; (3) encourage flexible, individualized 
credit assessment practices; and (4) involve a regulatory agency charged 
with enforcement, which is adequately resourced to properly monitor and 
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Building on these criteria, Wilson blames the South African and European consumer 
credit regime for being ineffective insofar as both jurisdictions, so she argues, focus 
on responsible borrowing instead of responsible lending.313 Moreover, she contends 
that pre-contractual assessments in general and inflexible credit assessment methods 
in particular bear the risk of being interpreted in such a way that it leads to restrictive 
lending practices, which exacerbate financial exclusion.314 Similar concerns have been 
raised within the EU pertaining to the MCD in particular. These critiques also fear 
financial exclusion through the instrument of pre-contractual affordability 
assessments, though with a slightly different line of argumentation.315 
Against the backdrop of these criticisms and concerns, and based on the findings 
in the previous chapters, the study explores whether the critique of pre-contractual 
assessments is well founded. The study examines (a) whether the responsible credit 
regime as set out in the provisions of the NCA and MCD actually focuses on 
responsible borrowing instead of responsible lending or if it can be considered 
effective, benchmarked against the above-mentioned criteria developed by Wilson, 
and (b) whether the responsible credit regime leads to restrictive lending practices that 
exacerbate financial exclusion, and if so, whether this is justifiable against the 
background of the objectives of the NCA and the MCD. 
 
2.1 Effectiveness of the responsible credit regime in South Africa and the EU 
2.1.1 South Africa 
As stated above, the NCA places an obligation upon consumers to answer fully and 
truthfully during a pre-contractual assessment in terms of section 81 of the NCA.316 It 
is a complete defence to an allegation that a credit agreement is reckless if the credit 
provider establishes that the consumer failed to fully and truthfully answer any 
requests of the credit provider.317 In the light of the foregoing, Wilson concludes that  
the South African consumer credit regime includes an ‘unfortunate focus on 
responsible borrowing’.318 This conclusion, however, gives a distorted picture of the 
pre-contractual assessment under the NCA. Van Heerden and Renke correctly point 
out that the South African reckless lending regime imposes an onerous pre-assessment 
																																																						
313 Ibid at 126. 
314 Ibid. 
315 A Rank & M Schmidt-Kessel op cit note 253 at 179. 
316 See chapter 3 para 1.3 above. 
317 Ibid. 




obligation on a credit provider.319 The credit provider must inter alia verify the 
consumer’s debt re-payment history and make sure that the consumer gets a general 
understanding and appreciation of the risks and costs of the proposed credit.320 The 
obligation for a consumer to cooperate in the course of a pre-contractual assessment 
by answering fully and truthfully is merely one piece of a much larger puzzle. In this 
context, it has to be taken into consideration that the credit provider must be able to 
rely on the peculiar knowledge that the consumer has about his or her own financial 
situation.321 Where the pre-contractual assessment is based on inaccurate or falsified 
information, the assessment’s purpose to prevent the granting of unaffordable loans 
may effectively be defeated, especially if the accurate information would have led to 
a negative outcome of the assessment. It therefore seems reasonable that the NCA 
applies sanctions to consumers who deliberately provide inaccurate or falsified 
information or intentionally did not provide information that would have led to a 
negative outcome of the assessment.  
The obligation of the consumer to cooperate in the assessment is also in line with 
the objectives of the NCA as set out in section 3 and how these are perceived in the 
case law. As has been said before, the NCA is designed to protect consumers, but 
consumer protection is not its sole or predominant purpose. The NCA was not intended 
to make South Africa a ‘debtor’s paradise’.322 
In conclusion, it can be established that there is no such ‘unfortunate focus on 
responsible borrowing’ in the South African responsible lending regime as indicated 
by Wilson. 
Measured against the other criteria Wilson uses to benchmark the likely 
effectiveness of a responsible credit regime, the following can be observed: First, the 
NCA is not limited to residential mortgage loans but focuses on consumer credit in 
general. Secondly, the responsible credit regime involves a regulatory agency in the 
form of the National Credit Regulator that monitors the consumer credit market and 
has the duty to enforce the NCA including the provisions pertaining to reckless 
lending.323 It is, however, questionable whether the NCA and the AARs encourage 
flexible and individualised credit assessment practices. As concluded in chapter 3 of 
this study, the development of the rules on pre-contractual assessments show a trend 
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towards standardisation and formalisation. It is conceded that this trend poses a 
potential threat to the flexibility of the assessment procedures, and may thus also have 
a negative impact on the accessibility to credit and the effectiveness of the responsible 
lending regime if benchmarked against the criteria developed by Wilson. 
 
2.1.2 European Union 
According to the MCD, the pre-contractual assessment must be based on accurate 
information. While it would not be appropriate to apply sanctions to consumers for not 
being in a position to provide certain information324, Article 20(4) of the MCD 
provides that Member States shall have measures in place to ensure that consumers are 
aware of the need to provide correct information upon request of the credit provider. 
Despite the fact that the MCD thus acknowledges the need for cooperation of the 
consumer in the assessment, the credit provider clearly bears the brunt of carrying out 
a proper pre-contractual assessment. It is inter alia the credit provider’s obligation to 
gather the information by specifying in a clear and straightforward way at the pre-
contractual phase the necessary information and independently verifiable evidence 
that the consumer needs to provide and the timeframe within which the consumer 
needs to provide the information.325 Moreover, it is first and foremost the credit 
provider who faces sanctions if the creditworthiness assessment falls foul of the 
requirements of the MCD as transposed into the national law of the Member States.326 
In conclusion, the MCD has – just as the NCA and contrary to Wilson’s point of view 
– a strong focus on responsible borrowing. 
Regarding the other criteria developed by Wilson, one can observe that the 
responsible credit regime in the EU is not limited to residential mortgage loans despite 
the fact that the MCD sets out differential rules on residential immovable property. 
Prior to the enactment of the MCD, the CCD has already implemented a responsible 
credit regime on consumer credit contracts other than credit agreements for consumers 
relating to residential immovable property.327 In terms of flexible and individualised 
credit assessment practices, the MCD shows the same trend towards standardisation 
and formalisation as the NCA.328 Therefore, it cannot be assumed that the MCD 
promotes a flexible and individualised assessment procedure. 
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Lastly, regarding the criteria of a regulatory agency charged with enforcement, 
the European legal framework shows a complex coexistence of a European regulatory 
authority, namely the EBA329, and national regulatory banking authorities. It is beyond 
the scope of this study to elaborate on the interplay between the European and national 
regulatory agencies. For the purposes of this study, it is sufficient to note that the 
enforcement of the MCD is safeguarded and monitored either by the EBA or the 
national regulatory authorities of the Member States. 
 
2.1.3 Other criteria influencing the effectiveness of the responsible credit regime 
In addition to the criteria developed by Wilson, there might also be other factors that 
critically influence the effectiveness of the responsible credit regime. In this regard, 
attention has to be drawn especially to the sanctions and consequences of a defective 
or non-existent pre-contractual assessment. They are likely to have an impact on the 
effectiveness of the responsible credit regime insofar as they could deter credit 
providers from irresponsible lending and might enable the consumer to enforce or 
exercise individual rights in case of irresponsible/reckless lending. 
It has been shown that the legal consequences significantly differ in the 
jurisdiction of South Africa and the EU.330 Under South African law, reckless credit 
in terms of section 80(1) of the NCA may either be pursued as a cause of action, or 
invoked as a defence against the lawsuit of a credit provider.331 A credit agreement 
being recklessly granted may be suspended or set aside.332 In the light of the statutory 
objective to prevent and curb over-indebtedness, such a remedy seems far more 
appropriate compared to the sanctions as set out in the jurisdictions of the European 
Member States of France, Germany, Greece, Austria and Ireland.333 As indicated 
earlier, these sanctions will either be purely prudential (as in case of France and 
Austria), or will be limited to a reduction of interest and costs (Germany and Greece) 
or a right of the consumer to terminate the mortgage credit agreement (Germany). In 
all of these instances, the legislator disregards the fact that the consumer, in all 
probability, will not be able to repay the credit amount. A reduction of costs or interest 
will not safe the consumer from becoming over-indebted in the first place. It follows 
that the South African remedies of setting aside or suspending the credit agreement are 
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far more in line with the statutory objective of curbing over-indebtedness. In this 
regard, the South African responsible credit regime may be regarded as more effective 
compared to European law in general and jurisdictions of France, Germany, Greece, 
Austria and Ireland in particular.  
While the sanctions for reckless lending under the NCA compare favourably 
with those of the EU, i.e. some of its Member States, they might have a shortcoming 
considered in the light of the right of access to housing provided in section 26(1) and 
(3) of the Constitution. A credit agreement may be suspended or set aside as a result 
of reckless lending. It has also been noted, however, that the consumer is not entitled 
to further retain possession and utilise the credit provider’s security.334 While this is 
an equitable result in case of movable property335, the situation is different if the credit 
provider’s security is immovable property. It is not only the inconvenience and 
immense cost of requiring the consumer to vacate the immovable property, e.g. for the 
period of suspension.336 The remedies also need to be considered in the light of the 
constitutional right of access to housing in terms of section 26(1) and (3) of the 
Constitution, which calls for differential rules if immovable residential property is at 
stake. Notwithstanding that it is very difficult to get a sale in execution of immovable 
property in South Africa and the right to housing is considered before granting a 
mortgage foreclosure337, evictions should be prevented if the credit was being granted 
recklessly. This differentiation between movable and immovable residential property 
should be reflected in section 84 of the NCA. 338 
 
2.1.3 Concluding remarks 
The analysis of the likely effectiveness of the South African and European responsible 
credit regime as measured against the criteria developed by Wilson shows ambiguous 
results. While some of the criteria are fulfilled, namely the focus on responsible 
lending instead of responsible borrowing and the focus on consumer credit in general, 
not limited to residential mortgage loans, it cannot be assumed that the credit regimes 
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as set out in the NCA and the MCD encourage a flexible and individualised pre-
contractual assessment due to the trend of standardising and formalising the 
assessment procedure. However, contrary to Wilson’s assumption, it is debatable 
whether a flexible and individualised assessment procedure actually contributes to the 
effectiveness of the responsible credit regime. In fact, individualised and flexible 
assessments might actually thwart the objectives of pre-contractual assessments. If no 
binding guidelines for the assessment procedure are provided, credit providers might 
apply their own fragmented standards. This could either result in uncertainty on the 
side of the credit provider pertaining to the legal requirements of conducting a proper 
pre-contractual assessment, and uncertainty, in turn, could lead to restrictive lending 
practices that obstructs access to credit. Or else, credit providers could apply relaxed 
standards in terms of affordability assessments that lead to the granting of unaffordable 
loans. Either way, the objective of creating a responsible lending regime might be 
contradicted. It is therefore reasonable to apply binding standardised and formalised 
guidelines on the assessment procedure. These guidelines secure the unity in the 
application of the law and make the assessment procedure transparent to consumers. 
Consequently, flexible, individualised assessment practices as opposed to standardised 
and formalised assessments cannot be considered a suitable indicator for the 
effectiveness of a responsible lending regime. 
 
2.2 Responsible lending versus financial exclusion 
As this study shows, pre-contractual assessments are a key regulatory tool in 
South Africa and the EU in the aim of creating a responsible lending regime.339 They 
will prevent the granting of credit to those who cannot afford to repay them. Thereby, 
pre-contractual assessments shall contribute in achieving one of the main objectives in 
the efforts to create a responsible lending regime, namely the prevention of over-
indebtedness. 340 While it is beyond dispute that the prevention of over-indebtedness 
is a laudable intention, pre-contractual assessments have been criticised for 
exacerbating financial exclusion. In the following section, these criticisms pertaining 
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2.2.1 Financial exclusion in the South African mortgage credit market 
Wilson has expressed the concern that a responsible credit regime in general and pre-
contractual affordability assessments in particular necessarily lead to restrictive 
lending practices, especially in the mortgage credit market, which exacerbate financial 
exclusion.341 What remains to be seen is whether this assumption supported by the 
developments in the mortgage credit market as monitored by the National Credit 
Regulator and illustrated in the Consumer Credit Market Report.342 
Table 1 below shows the development of the mortgage agreements granted by 
size on a year-on-year basis from 2009 to 2016. The year-on-year development shows 
an overall increase in the mortgages granted. However, the majority of the agreements 
were granted in favour of larger-sized credit agreements. Mortgage agreements of up 
to R150,000 show significant declines. 
 
Table 1: Mortgages granted – size of agreements343 
























R0-R50k -25.42 -24.11 -14.26 -19.79 8.10 -27.52 -20.41 -40.89 
R51K-R100K -31.15 -17.17 -12.55 -15.00 -8.40 -18.99 -2.86 -12.47 
R101K-R150K -36.35 -5.54 -11.87 -10.45 3.49 -17.63 -4.35 -9.18 
R151K-R350K -33.62 14.51 3.87 -18.12 -0.58 -12.26 -10.02 -16.75 
R351K-R700K -31.16 26.05 15.78 -9.59 17.54 -2.37 -0.83 -7.62 
>=R700K -14.61 32.52 17.31 -1.26 25.25 8.31 13.43 -4.73 
Total -22.46 27.44 14.95 -5.00 21.37 4.50 9.26 -5.79 
 
According to table 2, an overall increase in the value of the mortgage agreements 
granted from R20,682,139 in 2009 to R37,342,883 in 2016 is recorded. As indicated 
in the table, the vast majority of mortgages granted is in favour of individuals with a 
gross monthly income of greater than R15,000. This income category accounted for 
98.16 per cent of the rand value of the mortgages granted at the end of 2016 (as 
compared to 92.21 per cent at the end of 2009). At the same time, the percentage share 
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of mortgage credit granted in the lower income bracket of up to R10,000 decreased 
from 2.37 per cent to 0.35 per cent. 
 
Table 2: Mortgages granted – gross monthly income of individuals (rand value)344 
Level of 
income 
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
<=R10K 489,963 524,507 561,907 303,004 242,376 207,796 142,431 130,372 
% share of 
credit 
granted 
2.37 % 1.97 % 1.88 % 1.06 % 0.71 % 0.57 % 0.36 % 0.35 % 
R10.1K-
R15K 
1,120,491 1,459,625 1,737,170 1,277,787 1,171,389 992,010 837,291 556,567 
% share of 
credit 
granted 
5.42 % 5.48 % 5.80 % 4.48 % 3.41 % 2.73 % 2.11 % 1.49 % 
>R15K 19,071,686 24,663,044 27,666,652 26,949,257 32,935,414 35,074,571 38,658,695 36,655,944 
% share of 
credit 
granted 




20,682,139 26,647,176 29,965,728 28,530,048 34,349,179 36,274,377 39,638,417 37,342,883 
 
While it may not be possible to establish a direct link between pre-contractual 
assessments and the developments in the mortgage credit market as presented 
above345, the following can be inferred from table 1 and 2 in respect of financial 
exclusion in the South African mortgage credit market: First, the enactment of the 
NCA including the provisions on pre-contractual assessments did not lead to restrictive 
lending practices in general. In fact, the total value of mortgages granted significantly 
increased from 2009 to 2016. This result, however, can be attributed solely to the 
increase in mortgages granted to individuals with a gross monthly income of greater 
than R15,000. Secondly, therefore, the assessment shows that individuals in the low-
income bracket are increasingly cut off from the mortgage credit supply and thus 
financially excluded. In this respect, the developments in the mortgage credit market 
are contrary to the statutory aim of making the credit market accessible to the low-
income and historically disadvantaged population. 346 
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To sum up, the developments in the mortgage credit market suggest that pre-
contractual (affordability) assessments may be an appropriate tool to curb over-
indebtedness. However, they do not contribute in improving the access to mortgage 
credit for low-income individuals. Further governmental action will therefore be 
required to improve the access to mortgage credit and/or housing especially for the 
low-income and historically disadvantaged population, and to meet the statutory 
objective of making the (mortgage) credit market more accessible especially to these 
individuals. The solution for this problem cannot be found solely on the regulatory 
level of pre-contractual assessments in terms of the NCA. 
 
2.2.2 Financial exclusion in the European mortgage credit market 
Regarding the MCD, no such empirical as provided in the Consumer Credit Market 
Reports pertaining to the South African mortgage credit market is yet available. It 
remains to be seen what the impact of the MCD on the practice of handing out 
mortgage credits will actually be on an economic level. However, critiques have 
already expressed the concern that the MCD exacerbates financial exclusion by 
practically excluding the value of the acquired property from the creditworthiness 
assessment.347 It is feared that certain groups of people, particularly young families 
and older people, are effectively cut off from the mortgage credit supply.348 Despite 
the fact that that this is a valid concern, it still seems reasonable to focus on the ability 
of the consumer to repay the mortgage credit instead of relying on the value of the 
acquired property, taking into account the MCD’s objective to prevent the granting of 
unaffordable loans, and the prevention of defaults, foreclosures and eviction.349 The 
credit instalments need to be paid out of the consumer’s disposable income, whereas 
the value of the property is the decisive element only insofar as to whether the credit 
provider gets full reimbursement of the outstanding credit amount or lowers its losses 
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Chapter 5: Conclusion 
 
As indicated in this study, the South African NCA and the European MCD both aim 
at implementing a responsible (mortgage) credit regime. They are alike in the sense 
that they seek to level different policy objectives, including the prevention of 
irresponsible lending and over-indebtedness, as well as the stability of the (mortgage) 
credit market as a whole. This justifies the implementation of a similar regulatory tool 
to prevent the granting of unaffordable loans, namely pre-contractual (affordability) 
assessments. Pre-contractual assessments as set out in the South African NCA and the 
European MCD are an adequate tool to prevent and curb over-indebtedness related to 
the granting of unaffordable mortgage credits. The trend of standardising and 
formalising the assessment procedure helps in securing the unity in the application of 
the law and makes the assessment procedure transparent to consumers. On that note, 
pre-contractual assessments contribute in implementing a responsible mortgage credit 
regime.  
Clearly, however, pre-contractual assessments are not the panacea for all the 
challenges in the mortgage credit market. They will particularly not be able to square 
the circle by both preventing over-indebtedness and facilitating access to credit at the 
same time. While access to credit might not be at the centre of importance in the 
European Union, the situation significantly differs in the South African jurisdiction. 
In the light of the developments in the mortgage credit market, the constitutional right 
of access to housing, and the objectives of the NCA, it is important to facilitate the 
access to credit. The statistics and figures presented in chapter 4 para 2.2.1 of this study 
illustrate this need especially for the low-income and historically disadvantaged South 
African population. In this respect, the South African jurisdiction needs an approach 
that is different from the legal framework in the European Union. Further 
governmental and/or legislative action will therefore be required in order to facilitate 
access to mortgage credits in South Africa. This might be achieved by providing e.g. 
government subsidies or sureties as collaterals for mortgage credit agreements. In this 
context, the South African mortgage credit regime needs to be flexible in the sense 
that it allows for credits to be granted in exceptional cases irrespective of the outcome 
of an affordability assessment. 
The study thus concludes that despite the fact that pre-contractual assessments 




size-fits-all’ approach. On the contrary, unique historical, social and economic 
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